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Summary findings
Grootaert's  study addresses the question of how well  finds that unemployment benefits and social assistance
Hungary's system of cash social transfers helps prevent  are well-targeted to the poor. The child care allowance is
or alleviate poverty - and whether different types of  a progressive social transfer; the child care fee is strongly
social transfer, or changes in eligibility rules, might better  regressive.
alleviate poverty.  Roughly 91 percent of Hungarian households receive
The social safety net in Hungary and other transition  one or more transfers. Hungary's social safety net
economies has undergone important changes. The  represents 54 percent  of spending in an average
conventional benchmark for measuring poverty in  household, and provides 38 percent of its income. In its
Hungary  -the  subsistence minimum - has lost much  entirety, the social safety net is progressive, but that
of its relevance because of the transition to a market  progressivity does not come cheaply. The average
economy. Grootaert  proposes two other benchmarks:  transfer is eight times the minimum that would be
the minimum pension (an absolute poverty line) and a  needed under perfect targeting.
relative poverty line set at two-thirds of mean household  In other words, there is significant room for
spending.  reallocating funds for improved welfare of the poor.
How well targeted to the poor are Hungary's social  Among possibilities for reform: abolish the child care
transfers? The study distinguishes between six  allowance and fee, institute new child care benefits, and
components  of the social safety net: pensions,  improve means testing for social assistance.
unemployment benefits, family allowance, child care  Data used are from the 1993 Household  Budget
allowance, social assistance, and child care fee. Grootaert  Survey and the 1992-94  Household Panel Surveys.
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Poverty and Social Transfers  in Hungary
Christiaan  GrootaertSUMMARY
The objective of this study is to answer the question how the system of cash social
transfers in Hungary contributes to preventing or alleviating poverty.  This is an important
aspect of the external efficiency of the social safety net.  The study also undertakes a set of
simulations to see how re-allocation of funds across different types of social transfers and
changes  in the eligibility  rules could increase  the poverty  alleviation  impact.
As in other economies in transition, the social safety net in Hungary has undergone
important  changes. The major one was the introduction  of unemployment  benefits, as a result
of rapidly emerging unemployment. In  1993, Hungary spent 27.7% of its GDP on social
expenditures, well above the average for the European Union (21.8%) and for the OECD
(22.3%).  Cash transfers were 19% of GDP, with more than half going to pensions.  The
various family and child allowances  accounted  for 4.2% of GDP, and unemployment  benefits
were 2.4% of GDP.  Reform of the social safety net has become an urgent matter in Hungary,
because  the current system is no longer fiscally sustainable.
To investigate  the distributional  impact of the social transfer system, this study utilizes
two data sources.  The 1993 Household Budget Survey (HBS) is the first HBS which fully
incorporates  Western economic concepts.  It covers the whole non-institutional  population  of
Hungary.  The 1992-93-94  Household Panel Survey surveys the same households  over time
and thus permits to study the dynamics of poverty.  Household expenditure per equivalent
adult is used as measure of living standard, rather than income, for two reasons.  First, there
are strong and well-known  theoretical advantages  to using household  expenditure for poverty
analysis, because it is deemed to reflect better permanent income.  Second, the weight of
evidence, from the  1993 HBS as  well as  from earlier HBS,  suggests that the  reporting
problems  are more severe with income. This pertains especially  to private sector income.
The  conventional benchmark for  measuring poverty  in  Hungary,  the  subsistence
minimum, has lost much of its relevance since transition.  In  1993, 58% of the Hungarian
population  had an expenditure  level below the subsistence  minimum, which makes it no longer
useful as a criterion to identify  people in poverty. The CSO has in fact stopped  calculating  the
minimum  as of 1995. Poverty has therefore been measured  against two other benchmarks:  the
minimum  pension, which serves as absolute poverty line, and a relative poverty line set at 2/3
of mean household  expenditure.  In  1993, 4.5% of the population had an expenditure level
(per equivalent  adult) below the minimum  pension, and 25.3% had an expenditure  level below
the relative benchmark.
Poverty Prorde
Among socio-economic  groups,  the highest poverty occurs among households  where
the head is either unemployed, temporarily  employed, or dependent  on child care benefits as
main source of income.  About one fifth of such households  live in absolute poverty (below
minimum pension), and more than 50% are below the relative poverty line (2/3 of mean).
Poverty among pensioners  is slightly above average, and the lowest poverty incidence  occurs
2among the three groups with economically  active household heads:  permanent employees,
self-employed  and sole proprietors. The latter, who make up 19%  of the population, are the
richest group in Hungarian society.  They have managed to take advantage of the economic
opportunities  offered  by the private sector, following  transition. The other extreme is made up
by those people who in a sense are the victims of transition:  the unemployed  and those with
only tenuous labor market connection-in  all,  only  7%  of  the  population lives in  such
households,  but they constitute  30% of the absolute  poor.
In households  affected by unemployment,  poverty is higher if the head is unemployed
than  if  another  household member is  unemployed.  If  the  head  is  unemployed and
unemployment  benefits are not received, poverty incidence exceeds 40%,  which is 3 times
higher than if benefits are received. Households  in that situation  are not always picked up by
other parts of the social safety net, especially  social assistance.
The regional  variation in poverty incidence, is much less pronounced  than that across
socio-economic  groups.  Budapest  has the lowest poverty incidence, while the predominantly
rural North and South Plains have the highest  poverty incidence. Poverty is higher in villages
than in cities, which is related  to the fact that unemployment  is higher in villages than in cities.
However, regional  differences  in poverty incidence  can be entirely explained  by differences  in
the socio-economic  and demographic  composition  of the population.
Demographic  characteristics are important indicators  of poverty in Hungary.  Poverty
incidence is lowest in  nuclear households with  I or  2 children.  It rises steadily with the
number of children and is especially  high in households  with 2 adults and 4 or more children,
and in households  with 3 or more adults and 3 or more children.  Among those households,
one in five have a level of living below the minimum pension, and more than 70% fall below
2/3 of mean expenditure. The corollary of these observations  is that poverty among children  is
somewhat  higher than in the population  at large.  Poor children live primarily in villages, and
in households  where the head has low education and no or a  temporary link with the labor
market. The correlation  between poverty and the presence  of children  in the household, makes
the presence  of children an important candidate indicator for the targeting of social transfers.
In 1993, three transfers (family allowance, child care allowance,  child care fee) were based on
this criterion.
There is a distinct gender dimension  to poverty in Hungary.  Poverty is higher among
female  headed households,  especially  if they are single adults with children.
There is a strong inverse relation between poverty and the education of the head of
household.  Secondary or higher education virtually guarantees a  level of living above the
minimum  pension, and college and university puts all but 5% of people above 2/3 of mean
expenditure.  Poverty is significantly worse than average in households  where the head has
only primary education or less-and  almost 1/3 of the population lives in households  in that
situation.
3The poverty gap is quite low in Hungary:  11.7% of the minimum pension and 16.2%
of the relative benchmark.  This is a result of the high density of the expenditure distribution,
especially in  the range  between  one  half of  the  mean  and  the  mean.  This  also  reflects  a
significant degree of success of the social safety net in preventing pockets of deep poverty.
In terms of the dynamics of poverty,  there appears to be  a good degree  of mobility:
only  31% of households remained in the same income decile between  1993 and  1994, while
18% went down two  or  more deciles and  19% went up  two or  more deciles.  Most of  the
mobility occurred in the middle of the distribution.  Both the top and bottom were much more
stable.  In the bottom three  deciles,  where most of the poor are located, 40%  of households
stayed in the same decile.  Among the poorest decile, 57% stayed.
The Beneficiaries  of the Social Safety Net
This  study  has  distinguished  six  components  of  the  social  safety  net:  pensions,
unemployment  benefits,  family  allowance,  child  care  allowance,  social  assistance and  child
care fee.
Pensions are the most commonly received social transfer.  All pensioner households of
course receive pensions,  but so do about one fourth of all other socio-economic groups.  The
second  most  commonly  received  social  transfer,  by  44%  of  household,  is  the  family
allowance.  The coverage  of  households with  children  is virtually perfect,  reaching  99% or
100% in all but one category of households.  (That category is one adult with children,  were a
mere 4%  of  households do  not  receive the allowance).  The child  care  allowance  and  the
child  care  fee  are  paid  to  mothers  on  leave  from  work.  Respectively  7%  and  4%  of
households  receive  these  benefits.  Unemployment  benefits  are  received  by  16.2%  of
households,  and  by  90%  of  households  where  the  head  is  unemployed.  There  is  a
concentration  of beneficiaries  in  households  with  more than  two adults and/or  more  than 3
children.  This  suggests an  unfortunate coincidence of large household  size and broken  links
with  the  labor  market-both  strong  determinants  of  poverty.  Lastly,  social  assistance  is
received by  23%  of households  although  in terms  of  money it is  the least  important  social
transfer.  Generally  it is received  more in groups with high poverty incidence,  but  there are
exceptions.  Most notably,  26%  of sole proprietor  households receive social assistance,  even
though this is the richest group with the lowest poverty incidence.
How well targeted to the poor are these social transfers?  About 60% of households
below  the  minimum  pension  receive a  pension.  The  figure  rises  to  65%  for  households
between  the  minimum  pension  and  the relative  poverty  line,  and  declines  thereafter.  The
average pension  received by poor households is  135,857 HUF/year,  which is well above the
minimum  pension,  but  the  amount  contributes  of  course  to  the  expenditure  of  the  entire
household.  The average  pension received by a household above the subsistence minimum is
200,310  HUF/year.  Thus  a higher percentage of poor  households receive pensions,  but the
amount  they  receive  is  lower  (which  of  course  partly  explains  their  poverty).  The
concentration  coefficient  of  pensions  is  -0.06,  which  indicates  that  pensions  in  Hungary
4contribute  to reducing  inequality in the distribution  of living standards in both an absolute and
relative  way.
Unemployment benefits are  strongly targeted to  the  poor:  27%  of  the  poorest
households  receive them, against only 13% of non-poor households.  The average annual
benefit is 80,000 HUF and does not vary much  by expenditure  level of the recipient.
The family  allowance  is a universal  benefit, and neither its incidence  of receipt nor the
amount received varies with the expenditure level of the recipient household.  There is a
marked  difference  in the incidence  patterns of the child care allowance and the child care fee.
Both are paid to mothers who stay away from work, but the allowance is a fixed amount,
while the fee is a proportion (65-75%) of the previous wage and it requires at least one full
year of previous work and social security contributions. As a result, the child care allowance
is a progressive  social transfer, while the child care fee is strongly regressive.
Lastly, social assistance  is well targeted  towards the poor:  39% of households  below
the minimum pension benefit from social assistance, against 19% of  household above the
subsistence  minimum. In addition, the amounts received  by the poorest households  are larger.
The amounts  are especially  high for households  with 3 or more children.
Looking at  the social safety net  in  its entirety, 91% of Hungarian households
receive one or more transfers, for an average amount of 162,238 HUF/year.  The social
safety net in Hungary represents 54% of the expenditure  of an average household, and
provides  38% of its income. This is a very high figure, even for a post-socialist  economy (in
Poland, for example, the equivalent figure for expenditure is 45%).  Pensions are the lion's
share (74%)  of this, and by themselves  contribute  40% to household  expenditure. The family
allowance  contributes  7%, and unemployment  benefits 4%.  The remaining  benefits constitute
about 3  % of household  expenditure.
In  total,  the  social  safety net  is  very  progressive, representing 117% of  the
expenditure  of the poorest households,  and 30% of the expenditure  of the non-poor, for a ratio
of 3.9:1.  The equivalent figures for income are 66% and 27%-a  ratio of 2.4:1-so  the
progressivity remains regardless of  whether household expenditure or  income is  used to
measure the living standard  of households. The respective  concentration  coefficients  are-0.05
and  -0.02,  so that  the  social safety net  in  Hungary contributes to  equalizing both  the
distributions  of household  income and expenditure,  in both a relative and absolute way.  Social
assistance  and unemployment  benefits  are the most pro-poor transfers, while the child care fee
is the least pro-poor transfer.
This progressivity  however, does not come cheaply.  Each poor person reached by the
safety net requires on average 90,900 HUF of transfers, and each poor person lifted out of
poverty requires 156,250 HUF (excluding  administrative  costs).  This compares  to an average
poverty gap  of  19,680 HUF,  and  means that the  average transfer is  eight times the
minimum that would be needed under perfect targeting.  While some of this difference
5stems from the fact that many transfers do not have explicit poverty alleviation objectives,
targeting failure (leakage)  in those programs that do aim to reach the poor is clearly  present.
Closing  the Poverty  Gap
The success  of a social transfer system is not only measured  by the degree to which the
benefits are received by the poor,  but also by the extent to which it contributes  to closing the
poverty gap.  This depends on the extent to which transfers  go to  people or  households who
are poor prior to the receipt of the given benefit (ex-ante targeting) and on the amount of the
benefit  in  relation  to  the  poverty  gap.  The  social  transfer  system  in  Hungary  is  fairly
successful  in ex-ante targeting, but a substantial  degree of leakage still occurs.  As far as non-
pension transfers are  concerned, 30% or  more of current recipients of  social transfers in
Hungary were above the subsistence minimum even before they received the transfer.  Only in
the case of unemployment benefits, was the figure lower (20%).  This means that from 16% to
38% of all transfers went to households who were above the subsistence minimum prior  to the
receipt  of  the  transfer.  If  one  uses  the  relative  poverty  line  (2/3  of  mean  household
expenditure) as benchmark rather  than the subsistence minimum, the leakage represents from
36%  to  65%  of  funds.  This suggests  that  there  is  significant  room  in  the  system for
reallocation in favor of the poor.
The reform  measures  which  the Government  of Hungary  announced  in  March  1995
address some of these concerns.  They include the introduction of means-testing for the family
allowance,  which,  if  implemented  effectively,  could  reduce  the  leakage  in  that component
significantly.  However,  other measures could also be envisaged.  In  the case of the family
allowance,  the  upper  age  limits  (16  years,  and  20  years  for  full-time  students)  seem
excessively  generous,  and  a reduction  could free up resources  for  targeted programs.  Even
though social assistance is the best targeted of all social transfers,  it is intended to be available
only to poor households and this is clearly not the case.  More effective means-testing should
make it fairly  easy  to  at least  screen out  the richer  households,  and  the freed-up  resources
could be  redistributed  to  the poor.  In  general,  the  role  of  social  assistance  as  a  poverty
alleviation tool could be enhanced.  Currently,  it absorbs only  2.5%  of the total resources of
the social safety net, and even for the poorest households, it rarely represents more than 5-7%
of their expenditure.
For those recipients  of social transfers who are poor prior to the receipt of the transfer,
one can ask the question how many of them are moved above the poverty line as a result of the
transfer.  Because  pensions  are  by  far  the  largest  component  of  the  safety  net,  it  is  not
surprising  that they contribute the most to keeping people out of poverty:  62% of households
who receive pensions are lifted above the poverty line (2/3 of mean expenditure)  because of
the pension.
The  second best  poverty  alleviation  effect  (43%)  is achieved  by the child  care  fee.
This might at first sight be surprising given that this is the most regressive transfer in the
system. The explanation  is that the average  amount of the child care fee is quite high:  86,112
HUF/year, because it is a wage-replacement  amount.  Therefore, the absence of this amount
6can and does often make the difference  between being poor or not.  The effect is particularly
strong  in Budapest.
Unemployment  benefits and the family allowance each lift 39% of pre-transfer poor
recipients out of poverty.  This figure is fairly uniform across different parts of the country,
but it varies a lot across types of households. In the case of households  consisting  of 2 adults
and 3 children (where  coverage of the allowance  is 100%), 49% of those who are poor prior to
the allowance  are lifted above the poverty line.  This figure drops to 21  % of households  with 4
or  more children, reflecting that the  amount is insufficient, so  that poverty among them
remains high.
Social assistance is the most progressively  distributed transfer, but it has the lowest
poverty alleviation  effect.  This is mainly the result of the low amounts of money  per recipient
household (18,207 HUF/year on average).  This supports that the poverty alleviation role of
social assistance  needs to be strengthened,  both by increasing  financial  resources available to it
(from savings  in other parts of the system)  and by better targeting.
A further assessment  of the social safety net's ability to help the poor can be made by
showing the transfers received by the poor as a fraction of the poverty gap.  In total, the
social transfers received by  the poor  (below the  relative poverty line)  are 288% of  the
(remaining)  poverty gap.  This means that without  the transfers, the poverty gap would be
almost 3 times larger.  However, the  transfers received by  non-poor people above the
subsistence  minimum  are almost 4 times larger the than poverty gap.  The family allowances
received by these households would by themselves almost be sufficient to cover the entire
poverty gap.  This clearly points at the importance of the reforms of the family allowance
proposed  by the Government.
Modifying  the Social Safety Net
In March 1995, the Government  of Hungary  announced  several  proposals to modify  the
social safety net.  The main innovation is the introduction  of means testing for the family
allowance  and child care benefits.  An income cap for eligibility  for the family allowance  is
introduced, equal to 25,000 HUF gross income per month per capita, prior to the receipt of
the family allowance.  If the household  contains two wage earners and one child, the family
allowance is payable only until the child's sixth birthday.  The child care allowance and the
child care fee are abolished; a new child care benefit is introduced, equal to the minimum
pension, and payable until the child's third birthday, in households under the income cap
applicable  for the family  allowance.
The new income cap removes the eligibility of  26% of  households, i.e.  74%  of
households  fall below the cap.  The effect of introducing  the income and age eligibility  caps on
poverty is slight: with the minimum  pension  as benchmark,  poverty incidence  is unchanged  in
the aggregate, and with the relative benchmark, it rises from 25.3% to 26.5%.  Among the
very poor, the effect is felt strongest in households  with 3 or more adults and 1-2 children and
in households  of temporary  employees. In the latter, poverty rises from 19.39%  to 22.1  %.
7The introduction  of the income cap would lead to budgetary savings  of about 22  %, and
some of these funds could be reallocated and targeted to high poverty groups.  The poverty
profile identified  pockets of high poverty in households  with 3 or more children, in households
where there are 2 or more unemployed  members, and in households  where the head has less
than primary education.  The family allowance could be increased for households meeting
these conditions.
Simulation  of the effect of such increases shows that only targeting by the number of
children would lead to a significant  reduction in overall poverty incidence  (by 0.7 percentage
points relative to the minimum pension and by  1.3 percentage points relative to  the higher
benchmark). The other two modes of targeting are virtually poverty-neutral  in the aggregate.
Of course, different types  of households  would be affected differently. For example, targeting
by  the  number  of  unemployed has  a  strong  poverty alleviation effect  in  the  largest
households-those with 3+  adults, since unemployment  is concentrated  there.  Targeting by
education is  the  only  approach which leads  to  significant poverty  reduction among the
temporary  employees.
In general, the results suggest that significant poverty reduction can be achieved with
indicator  targeting, but it also suggests  that using a family allowance, i.e. basing the amount  of
social transfers  on the number  of children, is not always efficient from the poverty perspective.
A general income supplement,  or increased social assistance may  be more effective  in reaching
households  where unemployment  or low education  is the main cause of poverty.
The abolishment of the child care allowance and fee and the institution of the new
child care benefit would lead to budgetary savings in excess of 50%,  but would increase
poverty from 4.5% to 5.2% below the minimum  pension, and from 25.3% to 26.6% below
the relative poverty line.  Most seriously affected are households  with many children, with
unemployed  heads, and, by definition, those dependent  on child care benefits.  For example,
in households  with 2 adults and 4+  children, poverty incidence increases from 19% to 27%,
and in households  with 3+  adults and 3+  children, poverty incidence  almost doubles to 40%.
There is thus a risk that this part of the reform proposal will hurt some poor groups.  The
replacement  benefit appears to be too low and/or insufficiently  targeted  towards the poor.
Social assistance could be given a greater role in  poverty alleviation.  It  should be
possible to improve  the means-testing  for social assistance, and if, for example, leakage of
funds to households  above the government's new income cap could be eliminated, it would
create a fund which could be reoriented towards the poorest recipients.  The amounts saved
under such scenario constitute 36% of  social assistance now received by those below the
relative poverty line and 136% of social assistance  received by households  below the minimum
pension.  Allocating these funds proportionately to current receipts, would reduce poverty
respectively  by 0.6 and 0.9 percentage  points.
8I. Background and  Obiectives
This paper aims to  answer the question how the  system of social transfers in Hungary
contributes to  preventing  or alleviating poverty.  This is an  important  aspect  of the  external
efficiency of the social safety net (the internal efficiency of the system has been investigated in
World Bank, 1992).  The paper will also undertake a set of simulations to see how re-allocation
of funds across different types of social transfers and changes in the eligibility  rules could increase
the poverty alleviation impact.  It must be noted that the scope of this paper is limited to cash
transfers.'
As in  other  economies in transition,  the  social safety net2 in Hungary  has undergone
important changes.  The major one is the introduction of unemployment benefits, as a result of
rapidly emerging unemployment.  From a mere 2% in 1991, unemployment rose to  12% of the
labor force in 1994.  A detailed description of Hungary's social transfer system as it operated in
1993, is given by Ministry of Finance (1993), and need not be repeated here.  For this study, we
have grouped the different elements of the safety net in six categories:
- Pensions (retirement and disability)
U  Unemployment benefits
*  Family allowance (including maternity allowance)
- Child care allowance
*  Social assistance
*  Child care fee
In 1993, Hungary spent 27.7% of its GDP on social expenditures, well above the average
for the European Union (21.8%) and for the OECD (22.3%).  Cash transfers were 19% of GDP,
with more than half going to pensions.  The various family and child allowances accounted for
' Transfers  in-kind  occur mainly  through the provision  of education  and health care. and through consumer
subsidies. Although  important  education  and health  subsidies  still exist in Hungary,  the relative  importance  of in-
kind  transfers  has been decreasing.
2 The terms "social  safety net" and "social  transfer  system"  are used interchangeablv  in this paper.
94.2% of GDP, and unemployment benefits were 2.4% of GDP.  The cost of the social safety net
has risen significantly  in recent years.  The cash transfers component went from 14.9% of GDP in
1990 to  19.0 % in 1993.  This was only partly offset by a decline in the share of GDP going to
subsidies.
Reform of the social safety net has become an urgent  matter in Hungary, because the
current system is no longer fiscally sustainable.  Such reforms, especially in the pension system,
are discussed in detail in World Bank (1995).  In this paper we estimate the impact on poverty of
proposals to reform the other cash transfers.
This paper is organized as follows.  In the following section, we review the data sources
and  methodological considerations,  especially relating to  the  choice of  household  income  or
expenditure as basis for the analysis.  Sec.ion 3 contains the profile of poverty in Hungary.  In
section 4, the amount of transfers and the distribution of beneficiaries are examined.  The impact
of  each component of the  social safety net on  poverty is estimated in  section  5.  Section 6
simulates possible changes in this impact stemming from selected proposals to reform the system.
1L Data and  Methodolo;ical  Considerations
This study utilizes two data sources:  the 1993 Household Budget Survey (HBS) and the
1992-93-94 Household Panel Survey (HPS).
The 1993 HBS, which is the main data  source, is part of  a tradition of budget surveys
undertaken  by  the  Central  Statistical Office (CSO)  since the  early  1950s.  The  surveys are
conducted every two years, and 1993 is the first HBS which fully incorporates Western economic
concepts.  The 1993 sample is about 9000 households, selected in a two-stage stratified design,
and  covering the whole non-institutional population in Hungary.  The HBS  is the basis of the
poverty profile and the incidence analysis of social transfers in the following sections.
10The BPS  is a panel survey conducted by TARKI (Social Research Information Center),
aimed at following changes in the social and economic conditions of Hungarian households.  The
HPS' main advantage is that it follows the same households over time and thus permits to study
the dynamics of poverty.  It  is this  feature  of the  data which is utilized in this  report.  The
drawback  is  that  the  sample  size  is  only  2000  households,  which  limits  the  amount  of
disaggregation in the analysis.
The most important methodological point to be addressed is whether household income or
expenditure should be used as basis for the analysis. Most previous work on poverty and social
transfers in Hungary has relied on income (for example, Szivos, 1994, Toth et al., 1994, Van De
Walle et al., 1994, Milanovic, 1991).  The main reason for this was the high quality of income
data in past Hungarian household surveys, stemming in part from the fact that wages in the state
sector and government transfers used to be the main sources of income and these could easily be
cross-checked at the firm or state level.  Since transition, this has changed, and a variety of private
sector incomes have emerged.  It is well known that there is a large "black" or "grey" economy
operating  in Hungary, which largely escapes taxation and recording in official statistics.  Even
fully legal and known own account activities are often missed in household income surveys.  In a
detailed comparison of survey income figures with macro-economic aggregates,  Revesz (1994)
found that wage earnings were fairly well reported in the 1989 and 1991 HBS (91% and 86% of
the macro-total,  respectively), but  self-employment income was  underreported  by as  much as
80%.
A similar analysis has not been done yet for the 1993 HBS, ot  the survey results suggest
that the problem of underreported income from own account activities has remained.  According
to Table 1, reported household income and expenditure (adjusted for the size and composition of
households-see  below) in the 1993 BHBS  are identical.  This is the case in Budapest as well as in
the  rest  of the  country.  There  are  however  some  differences according  to  socio-economic
category.  For groups where wages and pensions are the main sources of income, the difference
between average income and expenditure is small.  For the self-employed and sole proprietors,
expenditure exceeds income by almost 30%, most likely as a result of underreported income.  For
11poorer groups, such as households headed by an unemployed person or those relying on child care
benefits as main source of income, expenditure exceeds income probably as a direct result of the
low level of income, necessitating borrowing or dissaving.
Table 1. Average  household  expenditure  and disposable  income  per equivalent  adult (HUF  per year).
Household  expenditure  Household  income  per  Expenditure  as
____________________  per equivalent adult  equivalent adult  percentage of income
Budapest  200,598  201,690  99.5%
Towns  183,801  182,944  100.5%
Villages  171,284  171,263  100.0%
Permanent  employee  200,996  204,861  98.1%
Temporary  employee  133,401  133,130  100.2%
Self-employed  227,440  179,542  126.7%
Sole  proprietor  267,701  207,277  129.2%
Unemployed  136,548  120,267  113.5%
Pensioner  155,807  158,844  98.1%
Child  care receiver  170,008  139,388  122.0%
Other  165,618  155,434  106.6%
Country  182,771  182,643  100.1%
This  equality between  average  household income  and expenditure  in the HBS  results
raises questions because it does not correspond to the economic reality as captured in the national
accounts.  According to  these, total  household consumption was roughly 1900 billion HUF and
total household income was 2200 billion HUF, implying an aggregate saving rate of about  14%
(see Szivos, 1995).
There is a further disturbing result in the  1993 HBS  data.  Annex table Al  shows the
distribution of income and expenditure by ventiles (5% of the population).  The figures imply that
the distribution of expenditure is less equal than that of income-a  highly unusual result.  The
Gini-coefficients are 0.21 for income and 0.26 for expenditures.  Figure I plots the distributions.
12Observations from  almost  all countries-developed  and  developing-suggest  that  the
distribution of expenditure is more equal than that of income because typically the rich save and
the poor  (and often the middle classes) dissave.  If the HBS  results correspond  to  economic
reality, the reverse would be true in Hungary.  Since income is disposable income, it would mean
that  the income tax system is very progressive in Hungary to  the point of pulling the highest
incomes below expenditure, while at the same time the social transfer system is so generous that it
pushes the income of the poor above their expenditure level.  Alternatively, the HBS results could
reflect reporting errors, in particular underreporting of income by the rich and underreporting of
expenditure by the poor.  The former is very likely, and consistent with the numbers in Table 1.
Evidence in Hungary as well as in other transition economies suggests that private sector incomes
have the most unequal distribution, and these are the incomes which the rich are likely to hide.
Underreporting of expenditures by the poor is less self-evident, but it is possible, to the extent that
people with low education, the elderly, and others who may have difficulty reporting expenditures
accurately are concentrated among the poor.  Such difficulties could arise in filling out the HBS
diary forms or simply in recalling expenditures.
The selection of income or expenditure as measure of household living standard will thus
have an impact on calculated poverty statistics as well as on indicators of the targeting of social
transfers.  The difference could be  significant.  Figure  I  shows  that  up  to  a  benchmark of
approximately 200,000 HUF/year, the selection of expenditure as criterion will lead to  higher
poverty estimates than if income is selected.  Moreover, households are ranked differently by the
two distributions: the Pearson correlation coefficient between household income and expenditure
is 0.71.3 This means that the pattern of poverty will not be the same with the two criteria.
3 This  is actually  a fairly  high  correlation  as far as household  survey  data  are  concerned.  In comparable  data  sets
in other  Eastern  European  and FSU  Countries,  correlations  as low  as 0.2 have  been  observed.
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1  4All this shows that there are some problems with the HBS data, although it does not take
away from the fact that it is the best data source available in Hungary to study poverty and social
transfers.  It  should also  be  emphasized that  such problems are by  no  means unique to  the
Hungarian FBS.  In fact, they are typical of almost all household surveys which collect both
household income and expenditure, although of course the extent of divergence between the two
measures differs.  Practically, the existence of these data imperfections does not absolve us from
deciding whether to use income or expenditure as basis of the analysis.  The choice has been to
use expenditure for two reasons:
*  There  are  strong  and  well-known  theoretical  advantages  to  using  household
expenditure for  poverty analysis, because it is deemed to  reflect better  permanent
income (for example, see Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980);
:  The weight of evidence, from the 1993 HBS as well as from earlier HBS,  suggests
that the reporting problems are more severe with income.  This pertains especially to
private sector income (however, it is clear that further research into this question is
needed).
The  use  of  household  expenditure as  basis to  measure the  well-being of  households
requires that two factors be taken into account:  household size and composition, and differences
in prices faced by different households. The former has been done by expressing expenditure on a
per equivalent adult basis.  The OECD-scale has been used (first adult =1; other adults =0.7;
children less than  14 years = 0.5).  This scale corresponds  closely to  the  one  implicit in the
calculation of  subsistence minima by  the  CSO  for  different types  of  households.  We  also
addressed the question whether prices differ in different parts of  Hungary.  While no  official
statistics are available to that effect, the answer appears to be negative, which is plausible given
that Hungary is a small country with good means of transportation. 4 Hence this study is based on
nominal expenditure as collected  in the survey.  This  is consistent with  use  of HBS  data  in
Hungary (for example, see Szivos, 1995).
4 A study  for  Poland  found  that  regional  price  variation  does  not  exceed  2%  for  the  average  consumption  bundle  as
a whole  (Grootaert,  1995).
15M.  Poverty Profile
Poverty Lines.  Hungary does not have an official or widely accepted poverty benchmark.
The  CSO  calculates  regularly  subsistence minima for  different types  of  households,  but  the
usefalness of this benchmark for poverty analysis has been reduced over time, because a rapidly
growing number of people have come to fall below it.  In 1993, 58% of the Hungarian population
had an expenditure level below the subsistence minimum (which in  1993 was on average  14,595
HUF/month, or $159 at the then prevailing exchange rate of $1 = 92.04 HUF).  It may be startling
at first to think that over half the Hungarian population live below a "subsistence minimum",  but it
has to be remembered that the calculation method of this minimum pre-dates transition, and the
methods do not reflect adequately the realities of a market economy.  In fact, in 1995, the CSO
discontinued the calculation.  In  recent years, the real value of  the subsistence minimum had
increased to where, in 1993, its average value was barely below average household expenditure
for the country.  Clearly, this makes it difficult to interpret this figure as a genuine "subsistence
minimum,"  meaning that those below it live in absolute poverty, and this explains why such a high
percentage of the population fall below it.'  Within the benchmarks utilized in the social transfer
system, only the minimum pension has a poverty connotation, as it implies the minimum needed
sum of money for a  single retired adult to  live on.  In  1993, the minimum pension was 6,000
HJF/mo  in January and February, 6,400 HUF/mo from March  to August, and 6,600 HUF/mo
from September to  December, for an average  of 6,400 HUF/mo.  Only 4.5%  of people lived
below  this  level, meaning  that  it can be used  to  identify the  poorest  individuals in Hungary
(Table 2).
Table  2  also  shows  two  relative poverty  lines i.e. lines derived from  the  data  itself
Relative poverty analysis often uses a set fraction (1/3, 1/2, 2/3) of mean expenditure as poverty
benchmark.  In Hungary, 9.3% of the poor had an expenditure level below half the mean (7,597
HUF/mo or $83), and 25.3% fell below 2/3 of the mean (10,129 HUF/mo or $1 10).  This big
5 The  same  phenomenon  has  been  observed  in other  transition  economies.  In Poland.  for  example,  55%  of  the
population  had expenditure  levels  below  the 'social minimum"  in 1993  (Grootaert,  1995).
16jump in poverty incidence when the benchmark is moved from  1/2 to 2/3 of the mean confirms
what  the plot of the full distribution  in Figure  I  already  showed, namely that  the Hungarian
expenditure distribution is  extremely dense in the middle range.  In  fact,  about  50% of  the
population is situated between half the mean and the mean.  This means that poverty counts will
be very sensitive -to where precisely the poverty benchmark is set.  In that range, on average, each
increase  of  the  poverty  line  by  500  HUF/mo  will increase  the  poverty  head  count  by  3.5
percentage points.  For that reason, the analysis below will focus on the profile of poverty and
investigate whether it differs as the poverty line changes.  In particular, we shall use the minimum
pension and 2/3 of average expenditure as poverty lines.
Table  2. Incidence  and depth  of  poverty,  for  alternative  povert lines.
Minimum  pension  1/2  of mean  2/3 of mean  |  Subsistence
(6,400 HUF/mo)  expenditure  expenditure  minimum
(7,597  HUF/mo)  (10,129  HUF/mo)  (14.595  HUF/mo)
Headcount  of poverty
Budapest  2.7%  6.9%  21.1%  49.6%
Towns  3.7%  7.9%  23.6%  57.4%
Villages  6.2%  12.1%  29.2%  63.8%
Countrv  4.5%  9.3%  25.3%  58.3%
Poverty  gap
Budapest  9.7%  11.6%  14.9%  21.4%
Towns  10.6%  12.6%  15.3%  20.9%
Villages  12.8%  14.1%  17.5%  22.7%
Country  11.7%  13.2%  16.2%  21.8%
Note:  Headcount  of poverty  is the percentage  of people  below  the poverty  line; poverty  gap is the poor's average
shortfall of household expenditure  per equivalent  adult as a percentage of the poverty  line.
The poverty gap  (the poor's  average shortfall of household expenditure relative to  the
poverty line) is quite low in Hungary:  11.7% of the minimum pension and 16.2% of the relative
benchmark (Table  2).  This means that  the average  person  with  a  level of living below  the
minimum pension has a shortfall of about 750 HUF/mo ($8) and the average person below 2/3 of
the mean has a shortfall of about 1,640 HUF/mo ($18).  This finding is of course consistent with
17(and  a result of) the high density of the expenditure distribution in the relevant range.  Low
poverty gaps,  and the  implication of  "shallow" poverty have  been found  in  other  transition
economies as well.  In Poland, for example, the poverty gap was estimated in the 13-16% range
for similar poverty benchmarks.
In the rest of this section, we look at the incidence of poverty and the distribution of the
poor along location, socio-economic, and demographic characteristics of the population.
Table 2 shows that poverty incidence, as well as the poverty gap, is lowest in Budapest,
and highest in villages. The difference is most pronounced at the minimum pension:  less than 3%
of Budapest residents fall below this level, but more than 6% of rural residents do so.
Poverty  and  Socio-Economic  Status.  There  are  significant  differences  in  poverty
incidence across socio-economic groups6 (Table 3 and Figure 2A-B).  The highest poverty occurs
among households where the head is either unemployed, temporarily employed, or dependent on
child care benefits as main source of income.  About one fifth of such households live in absolute
poverty (below minimum  pension), and more than 50% are below the relative poverty line (2/3 of
mean).  Poverty among pensioners is slightly above average, and the lowest poverty incidence
occurs among the three groups with economically active household heads:  permanent employees,
self-employed and sole proprietors. 7 Only about 2% of them fall below the minimum pension, but
there is more differentiation at the higher poverty line:  only 5% of the sole proprietors fall below
it against 23% of the self-employed.  Clearly, the  sole proprietors,  who make up  1% of the
population, are the richest group in Hungarian society.  They have managed to take advantage of
the economnic  opportunities offered by the private sector, following transition.  The other extreme
is made up by those  people who in a sense are the victims of transition:  the unemployed and
6 The  socio-economic  categories  are  based  on the  status  of the  head  of  household. This implies  some limitations  of
the  categorization.  For  example,  unemployed  people  are  found  throughout  all socio-economic  groups.  not  only  in
the "unemployed"  group, i.e. where  the head is unemployed.  Likewise,  employees  can be found in pensioner
households  and vice  versa.
' Self-employed  are defined  as workers  for their own account,  while sole  proprietors  own enterprises  which also
hire employees.
18those with only tenuous labor market connection-in  all, only 7% of the population lives in such
households, but they constitute 30% of the absolute poor (Table 4 and Figure 2C-E).
Table 3. Poverty  incidence  and poverty  gap by socio-economic  group.
Below  minimum  pension  Below  2/3 of mean expenditure
(6,400 HUF/mo)  (10.129 HUF/mo)
Headcount  Povertv  gap  Headcount  Poverty  gap
Permanent  employee  2.6%  9.5%  18.7%  13.8%
Temporary  employee  19.3%  15.1%  51.3%  22.5%
Self-employed  2.0%  10.5%  22.6%  12.9%
Sole  proprietor  2.0%  4.4%  4.7%  14.4%
Unemployed  17.5%  12.8%  57.4%  20.1%
Pensioner  5.7%  14.2%  35.7%  18.3%
Child  care receiver  23.6%  7.0%  54.8%  20.4%
Other  9.5%  12.9%  35.6%  16.9%
Country  4.5%  11.7%  25.3%  16.2%
Note:  Headcount  of poverty  is the percentage  of people below  the poverty  line; poverty  gap is the poor's average
shortfall of household expenditure per equivalent adult as a  percentage of the poverty line.  Socio-
economic  group classification  is based  on the status of the head of household.
Table 4. Distribution  of the poor by socio-economic  group.
Below  minimum  pension  Below  2/3 of mean  Share of each
(6,400  HUF/mo)  expenditure  socio-economic  group in
(10,129  HUF/mo)  total population
Permanent  employee  37.6%  47.8%  64.6%
Temporary  employee  4.3%  2.0%  1.0%
Self  employed  2.1%  4.1%  4.6%
Sole  proprietor  0.4%  0.2%  0.9%
Unemployed  20.3%  11.7%  5.2%
Pensioner  27.6%  30.2%  21.4%
Child care receiver  4.8%  2.0%  0.9%
Other  2.9%  1.9%  1.3%
All  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%
Note:  Socio-economic  group  classification  is based  on the status of the head of household.
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In terms of poverty alleviation policy, these households are obvious target groups.  They
can be reached well with indicator targeting (i.e. targeting based on status  only, without means
testing).  Leakage to  non-poor  households will be  limited, because fewer  than  20%  of such
households have an expenditure level above the subsistence minimum. However, the situation is
more difficult for the poor in households headed by a pensioner or permanent employee.  These
actually make up the bulk of the poor (65% of the absolute poor and 78% of the relative poor).
This happens in spite of the low poverty incidence among them because households headed by
pensioners and by permanent employees make up 86% of the total  population.  Within those
groups, other socio-economic or demographic characteristics can further identify the poor.
The households with the highest poverty incidence also have the largest poverty gaps, so
that they face a double jeopardy:  they have the highest risk of being poor  and their poverty is
deeper than that of other poor groups.  Nevertheless, the differences in poverty gaps across socio-
economic groups in Hungary are not  large by international standards, although they are larger
than in some other transition  economies such as Poland.  The earlier stated  observation that
poverty is shallow remains true  and indicates that  the social safety net  in Hungary has been
effective in preventing any one group from falling very much below the poverty line, regardless of
the cause of poverty.
22This has to  be considered in targeting.  Where the poverty gap  is even across groups,
resources  can be targeted mainly on the basis of differences in poverty incidence, even if the
objective is to reduce both poverty incidence and the severity of poverty.  However, where the
poverty gap varies across socio-economic groups, resources should be targeted according to the
product of the poverty headcount ratio and the expenditure gap ratio (see for example, Grootaert
and Kanbur, 1990, and Kanbur, 1989 for a discussion of targeting rules).  Groups with deeper
poverty should receive a larger share of resources than suggested by the poverty incidence alone,
because of the larger expenditure gap.
Poverty and  the Labor  Market.  Tables 3 and 4 highlight that the link with the labor
market is an important correlate of poverty status.  Although a thorough investigation of the links
between poverty and labor market participation falls outside the mandate of this paper, we do
want  to  highlight the  role of unemployment.  As  we  said  earlier, unemployment is a  recent
phenomenon in Hungary, and its rapid emergence is one of the reasons behind the rising cost of
the social safety net.
Unemployment is pervasive in almost every socio-economic group in Hungary (Table 5):
15-20% of households where the head is economically active have an unemployed member, and
1-2% have 2 or more unemployed members.  The incidence is much higher though in households
where the head is unemployed or dependent on child care benefits as main source of income.  The
coverage  of  unemployment benefits is  quite  high:  76%  of  households  where  there  is  one
unemployed member receive unemployment benefits, and 88% of those with multiple unemployed
members receive them.  (The fact that some households without unemployed members receive
benefits results from the fact that the Household Budget Survey uses a longer reference period for
income sources than for the determination of unemployment status.)
The relation between unemployment and  poverty incidence is clear from  Table  6  and
Figure 3, which classify households by whether or not the head is unemployed, by the number of
unemployed household members, and by whether or  not the household receives unemployment
23benefits.  Several observations emerge.  First, poverty is higher if the head is unemployed than if
another household member is unemployed.  Second, if the head is unemployed, unemployment
benefits make a  large difference in the incidence of poverty below  the minimum pension.  In
households without benefits, poverty incidence exceeds 40%,  which  is 3  times higher than if
benefits are received.  The difference disappears at the higher poverty line, but at that level, the
poverty  gap  is  about  30%  without  benefits against about  20%  with  benefits.  Third,  if the
household head is employed, poverty incidence rises with the number of unemployed household
members, but the effect of unemployment benefits on poverty is less pronounced.
Table 5. Unemployment by socio-economic group.
Households with no  Households with I  Households  With  2 or  Total
unemployed  member  unemployed  member  more unemployed
members
Permanent  employee  83.5%  14.9%  1.6%  100.0%
Temporary  employee  83.8%  15.4%  0.8%  100.0%
Self employed  80.6%  19.2%  0.2%  100.0%
Sole  proprietor  81.9%  18.1%  0.0%  100.0%
Unemployed  0.0%  70.4%  29.6%  100.0%
Pensioner  94.1%  4.9%  1.0%  100.0%
Child care receiver  63.4%  29.7%  6.9%  100.0%
Other  84.8%  14.1%  1.1%  100.0%
Country  83.2%  14.2%  2.6%  100.0%
Percent  receiving
unemployment  benefits  3.7%  76.2%  88.5%
While the relationship between unemployment and poverty needs to be investigated more
thoroughly, taking other factors (especially age and education) into account, at least two policy
considerations  can  be  extracted.  First,  the  end  of  unemployment  benefits  brings  about
considerable hardship in households where the head is unemployed, and many do not seem to be
picked up by other parts of the social safety net, especially social assistance.  This group is quite
small (about 2.5% of households where someone is unemployed), but there is no other category
of households, in any classification, where the incidence of absolute poverty was found to be so
24high.  Second, unemployment benefits make a distinct contribution to reducing poverty, and do so
more strongly among the very poor, which indicates that they are well targeted (we return to this
later, in section 4).
Table 6. Poverty  incidence  and gap by unemployment  characteristics.
Below  minimum  pension  Below  2/3 of mean expenditure
(6,400  HUF/mo)  (10,129  HUF/mo)
Headcount  Poverty  gap  Headcount  Poverty  gap
Unemployed  head, 1 unemployed
member,  benefits  16.6%  10.8%  56.8%  20.0%
Unemployed  head, 1 unemployed
member,  no benefits  40.3%  14.2%  52.1%  31.3%
Unemployed  head,  2+
unemployed  members,  benefits  12.4%  17.7%  59.7%  17.7%
Unemployed  head, 2+
unemployed  members,  no benefits  41.4%  9.5%  52.7%  29.4%
Employed  head,  0 unemployed
members,benefits  0.5%  22.2%  20.3%  12.8%
Employed  head,  0 unemployed
members,  no benefits  2.7%  11.1%  20.6%  15.1%
Employed  head, 1 unemployed
member,  benefits  4.4%  10.4%  30.5%  14.7%
Employed  head, I unemployed
member,  no benefits  14.8%  10.3%  43.2%  20.1%
Employed  head,  2+ unemployed
members,  benefits  22.1%  14.4%  62.6%  20.9%
Employed  head, 2+ unemployed
members,  no benefits  22.2%  15.3%  51.5%  23.3%
All  4.5%  11.7%  25.3%  16.2%
Note:  Headcount  of poverty  is the percentage  of people  below  the poverty  line; poverty  gap is the poor's average
shortfall  of household  expenditure  per equivalent  adult as a percentage  of the poverty  line.
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Poverty and Region.  We now turn to the regional variation in poverty incidence, which is
much less pronounced than that  across  socio-economic groups (Table  7).  Budapest  has the
lowest poverty incidence, while the predominantly rural North and South Plains have the highest
poverty incidence.  This is consistent of course with the earlier finding that poverty is higher in
villages than in cities.  This, in turn, is related to the fact that unemployment is higher in villages
than in cities.  All other regions have poverty ratios which are very similar, for both poverty lines,
suggesting that region is not a very important dimension for poverty alleviation policy in Hungary.
The poverty gap shows the same pattern as the headcount, with one exception:  Pest County has
the highest poverty gap, even though its poverty incidence is slightly below average.  It appears
that this area, which surrounds the capital city, has a few pockets of relatively deep poverty.  This
issue may need to be investigated further.
26Figure  3B: Poverty  Gap  by  Unemployment  Characteristics
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Table 7. Poverty  incidence  and poverty  gap by region.
Below  minimum  pension  Below  2/3 of mean expenditure  Share of each region
(6,400  HUF/mo)  (10.129  HUF/mo)  in total population
Headcount  Povertv  gap  Headcount  Povertv  gap
Budapest  2.7%  9.7%  21.1%  14.9%  19.5%
Pest County  4.2%  15.0%  23.7%  17.2%  9.3%
North Hungary  4.1%  13.7%  25.6%  16.0%  12.6%
North Plain  6.0%  11.0%  31.9%  16.9%  14.9%
South  Plain  6.0%  11.2%  28.2%  17.1%  13.4%
West  Transdanubia  4.2%  12.6%  23.4%  16.4%  9.7%
North Transdanubia  4.8%  10.6%  23.7%  16.2%  10.8%
South  Transdanubia  4.2%  11.4%  24.4%  15.1%  9.8%
Country  4.5%  11.7%  25.3%  16.2%  100.0%
Note:  Headcount  of poverty  is the percentage  of people  below  the poverty  line; poverty  gap is the poor's average
shortfall  of household  expenditure  per equivalent  adult as a percentage  of the poverty  line.
27Poverty  and  Household Characteristics.  Demographic  characteristics  are  important
indicators of poverty in Hungary.  Tables 8 and 9 and Figure 4 classify households according to
the number of adults and children.  Poverty is lowest in nuclear households with 1 or 2 children.
Poverty  incidence is around average  in childless couples or  single adults (many of whom are
pensioners).  Poverty incidence rises steadily with the number of children and is especially high in
households with 2 adults and 4 or more children, and in households with 3 or more adults and 3
or more children.  Among those households, one in five have a level of living below the minimum
pension, and more than 70% fall below 2/3 of mean expenditure.  It is noteworthy though that the
poverty gap of these households is not higher than average, suggesting that the social safety net is
effective in preventing that they become groups of extreme poverty.  The highest poverty gap
occurs  among single adults.  Although these are few  (6.5%  of  the  population), and  poverty
incidence among them is not very high, they do contain a pocket of deeper than average poverty,
indicating a possible weakness in the safety net.
In terms of  targeting,  Table 9 and Figure  4  make it clear that  the poverty  pattem  is
determined by the number of children in the household, and not household size, per se.  Holding
the number of children constant, poverty does not always increase with the number of adults (at
least until one reaches 4+ adults, where there is a jump in poverty incidence).  The correlation
between  poverty  and  the  number  of  children  is  much  stronger.  The  corollary  of  these
observations is that poverty among children in Hungary is somewhat higher than in the population
at large (Table 10). Poor children live primarily in villages, and in households where the head has
low education and no or a temporary link with the labor market.  The correlation between poverty
and  the presence  of  children in the  household,  makes the  presence of  children an important
candidate  indicator for  the  targeting  of  social  transfers.  Currently,  three  transfers  (family
allowance, child care allowance, child care fee) are based on this criterion.
28Table 8. Poverty incidence and poverty gap by type of household and gender of household head.
Below minimum pension  Below 2/3 of mean expenditure  Share of each
(6,400 HUF/mo)  (10,129 HUF/mo)  category in
total
population
Headcount  Poverty gap  Headcount  Poverty gap
1  Male  4.8%  12.9%  22.6%  21.1%  1.4%
1  Female  5.3%  15.6%  34.7%  19.5%  5.1%
1 Adult with  children  9.2%  9.5%  24.9%  19.0%  2.0%
2+ Adults  3.3%  12.4%  22.5%  16.4%  42.6%
2 Adults  with 1-2  2.8%  12.2%  20.4%  14.4%  26.9%
children
2 Adults  with 3 children  6.4%  7.8%  29.8%  13.7%  3.6%
2 Adults  with 4+ children  19.0%  11.1%  71.4%  14.5%  1.3%
3+ Adults  with 1-2  6.5%  10.6%  29.4%  15.8%  15.5%
children
3+ Adults with 3+  21.4%  11.6%  72.7%  21.2%  1.4%
children
Male  headed  household  3.8%  11.6%  23.7%  15.8%  77.0%
Female  headed  household  6.5%  11.9%  30.8%  17.4%  23.0%
All  4.5%  11.7%  25.3%  16.2%  100.0%
Note:  Headcount of poverty is the percentage of people below the poverty line: poverty gap is the poor's average
shortfall of household expenditure per equivalent adult as a percentage of the poverty line.
There  is  a  distinct  gender  dimension  to  poverty  in  Hungary  (Table  8).  Poverty  is  higher
among  female  headed  households.  In  the  case  of  one  person  households,  the  difference  is  not  so
large  at the  minimum  pension  level,  but  it is quite  pronounced  at  213 of  the  mean.  Poverty  is also
above  average  among  single  adults  with  children,  of  whom  the  majority  are  women.  Such
aggregate  figures  hide  of  course  many  different  situations  faced  by  women  with  respect  to  access
to  the  labor  market  or  extent  of  coverage  by  the  social  safety  net.  These  would  have  to  be
explored  further  before  it could  be  argued  that  gender  by  itself  is a valid  targeting  indicator.
29Table 9. Poverty  incidence  according  to the number  of adults and number  of children in household.
Below  minimum  pension
(6,400  HUF/mo)
Children
0  1  2  3  4+
1 Male  adult  4.8%  5.6%  0.0%  - _
I Female adult  5.3%  13.3%  0.0%  29.9%  0.0%
2 Adults  2.6%  3.3%  2.5%  6.4%  19.0%
3 Adults  3.6%  3.5%  6.8%  0.0%  29.5%
4+ Adults  4.3%  8.0%  14.7%  65.5%  24.1%
Below 2/3 of mean expenditurc
(10.  129 HUJF/mo)
Children
0  1  2  3  4+
1  Male adult  22.6%  30.4%  0.0%  - _
I Female adult  34.7%  25.2%  16.7%  30.0%  100.0%
2 Adults  24.2%  19.8%  20.7%  29.8%  71.4%
3 Adults  20.9%  19.9%  34.4%  60.5%  100.0%
4+ Adults  21.4%  36.2%  44.7%  71.4%  90.3%
30Figure  4A: Poverty  Incidence (Headcount)  according to the Number  of Adults
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31Table 10. Percent of children living in poor households.
Below minimum  Below 2/3 of mean
pension  expenditure
(6,400 HUF/mo)  (10,129 HUF/mo)
Budapest  3.8%  26.5%
Towns  4.7%  24.5%
Villages  6.9%  30.9%
Permanent employee  2.9%  21.6%
Temporary employee  18.6%  53.8%
Self employed  2.3%  22.8%
Sole proprietor  0.0%  6.0%
Unemployed  19.6%  63.7%
Pensioner  12.6%  51.8%
Child care receiver  26.6%  56.2%
Other  9.4%  31.7%
Male headed households  4.5%  26.0%
Female headed households  9.8%  33.6%
Education of head
Less than primary  29.6%  68.4%
Primary  11.7%  51.5%
Vocational  4.1%  25.1%
Special post-primary  7.1%  31.8%
Secondary grammar  0.7%  18.3%
Other secondary  1.0%  14.3%
High school  0.9%  4.9%
University  0.0%  21.1%
All  5.4%  27.4%
We next look at the link between education and poverty.  There is a strong inverse relation
between poverty and the education of the head of household (Table  11).  Secondary or higher
education virtually guarantees  a level of living above the  minimum pension,  and  college and
university puts all but 5% of people above 2/3 of mean expenditure.  Households where the head
32has vocational school have poverty levels slightly below average.  This leaves three target groups
with low levels of education, where poverty is significantly worse than average:  the largest group
is those with only primary education or less-almost  1/3 of the population lives in households
where the head is in that situation.  A much smaller group (less than 1% of the population) has
"special post-primary" education, and they too have higher than average poverty.
Table  II. Poverty  incidence  and poverty  gap according  to the  education  level  of the  head  of household.
Below  minimum  pension  Below  2/3 of mean  expenditure  Share of each
(6,400  HUF/mo)  (10,129  HUF/mo)  categoly  in
total
population
Headcount  Poverty gap  Headcount  Povertv gap
Less than primaiv  13.1%  14.5%  51.0%  20.7%  9.9%
Primary  7.3%  11.1%  37.3%  16.8%  26.6%
Vocational  2.9%  9.4%  22.7%  13.7%  28.6%
Special  post-prinmay  9.8%  9.6%  30.4%  15.7%  0.8%
Secondary  grammar  1.3%  15.6%  15.1%  14.4%  7.0%
Other secondary  1.2%  7.5%  12.3%  13.5%  15.3%
High school  0.3%  6.5%  5.5%  8.0%  6.5%
University  0.0%  0.0%  5.1%  7.7%  5.2%
All  4.5%  11.7%  25.3%  16.2%  100.0%
Note:  Headcount  of poverty  is the percentage  of  people  below  the povertv  line:  poverty  gap is the poor's  average
shortfall  of household  expenditure  per equivalent  adult as a percentage  of the poverty  line.
We  close this  overview of  the  poverty profile in Hungary  by  looking at  the relation
between age of the head of household and poverty incidence. Frequently, living standards display
an inverse U-shaped life cycle pattern, whereby the youngest and oldest have the lowest level of
living and the highest poverty.  This is also the case in Hungary (Table 12), but the age-effect is
stronger among the young than among the old.  This reflects on the one hand the pension system,
which keeps most pensioners out  of poverty, while on the other hand much unemployment is
concentrated among the young.
33Table 12. Poverty incidence and poverty gap according to age of head of household.
Below minimum pension  Below 2/3 of mean expenditure  Share of each
(6,400 HUF/mo)  (10,129 HUF/mo)  category in
total
l  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _  _  p  o  p  u  latio  n
Headcount  Poverty gap  Headcount  Poverty gap
< 25  11.2%  10.6%  41.7%  17.4%  4.0%
25-34  4.2%  8.7%  27.4%  14.1%  21.7%
35-49  3.9%  12.4%  21.0%  15.9%  42.6%
50-59  3.9%  12.5%  18.5%  17.4%  14.4%
>= 60  5.2%  13.4%  35.2%  17.9%  17.3%
All  4.5%  11.7%  25.3%  16.2%  100.0%
Note:  Headcount of poverty is the percentage of people below the povertv line, povertv gap is the poor's  average
shortfall of household expenditure per equivalent adult as a percentage of the pover,  line.
Poverty Profile  Based  on  Income  Data.  We  explained  in  Section  II the  rationale  for
basing poverty analysis on household expenditure data.  Nevertheless, as a sensitivity analysis, it is
useful to recalculate the poverty profile tables using net household income as criterion.  When
using  a relative  poverty  line (2/3  of mean  household  income  per  equivalent  adult),  the differences
with  the expenditure based  poverty profile where  minimal-very  few rank  reversals occurred
among categories of households (i.e. whereby one category appeared more poor than the other
with expenditure as criterion but less poor with income as criterion, or vice versa).  In the case of
the minimum pension poverty line, rank reversals were more frequent.  In particular, people living
in towns, single female adults, households where the head has less than primary education, child
care receivers, and the aged have lower poverty incidence with income than with expenditure as
criterion.  It is normal that sensitivity to the criterion is higher for a lower poverty line, especially
a line such as the minimum pension which, in the case of income, only cuts  off 2.5%  of the
population.
Multivariate  Poverty Analysis.  The analysis so far has indicated that there is a bivariate
relation  between  poverty  and  several  socio-economic  and  demographic  characteristics  of
34households in Hungary.  From the perspective of allocating resources for poverty alleviation, it is
essential to know what the relative importance is of each of the determinants of poverty.  Also,
several determinants have direct and indirect effects.  For example, a low education level results in
low income and  a  higher probability to  be poor,  but  it also  increases the  chance to  become
unemployed which in turn adds to the probability to be poor.  To take these considerations into
account, we undertook a basic multivariate analysis, combining all poverty correlates discussed so
far  (Table  13).  We estimated  two  models.  The  first  one  considers  the  full distribution of
household expenditure and shows the contribution to  living standards made by each household
characteristic (OLS estimation).  The second model shows how each household characteristic
affects the probability to be poor (probit estimation).
The results show that the observed differences in living standards and poverty between
Budapest,  towns  and  villages  are  due  entirely  to  differences  in  the  socio-economic  and
demographic make-up across these locations.  There is no location dimension per se to poverty in
Hungary.  All other  factors  we  considered  earlier  remain  significant determinants  of  living
standards and poverty in Hungary.  However, it must  be noted that the estimated expenditure
model only explains 20%  of the variation of  living standards across  households.  There  are
obviously many other factors which determine living standards in Hungary.
Education makes the largest contribution to  raising living standards.  Households where
the head has a college or university diploma have 66,721 HUF and 86,734 HUF,  respectively,
higher household expenditure per  equivalent adult than  households where  the  head only has
vocational  education  (holding all  other  household  characteristics  constant).  Socio-economic
category is the next most important determinant.  It  is noteworthy that, all other things equal,
pensioner status for the head of household lowers living standards by more than unemployment
status.  However, if additional members are unemployed and/or if no unemployment benefits are
received, this is no longer true, and then such a household has in fact the lowest living standard of
any group.  As expected, the composition of the household also matters, but to a lesser degree
than other variables.  The coefficients of the age variables indicate that the living standards life
cycle peaks at age 48.
35Table 13. Multivariate determinants of poverty.
Annual Household  Poverty Status
expenditure per  (percentage points change in the
l_________________________________  equivalent adult  probabilitv to be poor)
Below minimum  Below 2/3 of mean
pension  expenditure
(6,400 HUF/mo)  (10.129 HUF/mo)
Intercept  172,913  _  _
Towns  n.s.  0.08  -0.52
Villages  n.s.  0.46  -1.48
Temporary employee  49.611  8.64*  28.02*
Self-employed/sole proprietor  35.784  -0.25  2.28
Unemployed  -31,947  4.99*  18.99*
Pensioner  -36,259  0.45  12.27*
Other socio-economic group  -16,269  4.08*  11.36*
Number of unemployed in household  -15,114  0.64*  8.30*
No unemployment benefits  -12,257  3.97*  8.41*
Number of adults in household  -14,059  0.50*  4.28*
Number of children in household  -12,648  0.48*  5.07*
Age of head  2.948  0.01  -0.06*
Age of head squared  -30.4
Female headed household  -15,750  0.79*  5.89*
Less than primary school  -24,346  3.97*  18.59*
Primary or special post primary school  -17,251  1.91*  11.48*
Secondary school  31,780  -0.33  -8.09*
College  66,721  -1.17*  -14.14*
University  86.734  -2.24  -12.37*
R2  1  0.20
Note:  The  first  column  contains  OLS  coefficients.  All  are  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  90%
confidence level,  except  when  marked "n.s."  (not  significant).  The  second and  third  columns  show
percentage point changes  in the  probability to be poor for a one-unit  change  in an  explanatory variable
(derived from  probit estimates);  those significantly different from  zero at  the  90% confidence level are
marked with asterisk (*).  The reference category is a household in Budapest. with a male head who is a
permanent employee with secondary vocational education.
36The two poverty status models confirm that education and employment status are the key
determinants of poverty.  Temporary employees and those with less than primary education are
clearly at greater risk of being poor  than are other types of households.  Households where the
head is unemployed face a 5% greater probability of being poor (below the minimum pension)-
and this almost doubles if they receive no unemployment benefits.  All other things being equal,
pensioners are not more likely than other groups to  have a living standard below the minimum
pension, but they are 12% more likely to fall below 2/3 of the mean.
The models also confirm that larger households are more likely to be poor, but they show
that after controlling for other socioeconomic characteristics, there is little difference between the
effect  of  additional children and  that  of  additional adults  in  the  household.  Female-headed
household are more likely to  be poor,  even if they have otherwise the same characteristics as
male-headed households.
Finally, the results  show  that  the probability to  be  poor  is determined entirely be  the
economic and demographic characteristics of the household and is not additionally affected by the
type of locality where one lives (Budapest, town or village).  The fact that poverty is higher in
towns and villages is due to the fact that more unemployed and low-educated people live there,
and that demographic characteristics associated with poverty are more prevalent there.
Dynamics of Poverty.  The final task of this section is to review the dynamics of poverty,
based on the Household Panel Survey.  TARKI staff have constructed transition matrices showing
the location of each household in income deciles in  1993 and  1994 (see Andorka, Speder and
Toth, 1995). They found that only 31% of households remained in the same decile between 1993
and  1994, while 18% went  down two or more deciles and 19% went up two or  more deciles.
Most of the mobility occurred in the middle of the distribution.  Both the top  and bottom were
much more stable.  In the bottom three  deciles, where most  of the poor are located, 40% of
households stayed in the same decile. Among the poorest decile, 57% stayed.
37It would be very useful to undertake this analysis over the three-year period covered by
the panel data, and to focus specifically on the characteristics of the long-term poor.  It is indeed a
key policy question whether poverty is a temporary or permanent status for most poor, and which
people remain in permanent poverty.  The policy measures required to address the two types of
poverty are different.  Temporary poor  as best helped by cash transfers which help to  "bridge"
their period of poverty.  Long-term  poor may face fundamental problems of endowments (for
example, education) which may need to be addressed directly.  Re-training programs  fall under
this heading.  However, so do disability and old-age pensions, and the extent to which recipients
of these pensions are found among the long-term poor is a good measure of the adequacy of these
programs.  While the HPS data allow to answer those questions over the period  1992-94, such
analysis has not been undertaken yet.  It would seem to be a priority to determine the profile of
the long-term poor and to contrast it with the temporary poor.
Summary.  We can now summarize the poverty profile in Hungary as follows.  Poverty in
Hungary has strong socio-economic and demographic dimensions.  Poverty rates are low among
those with strong ties to the labor market and among the well educated.  Poverty is high among
the  unemployed and  those  with  temporary jobs,  among workers  with  low  education,  among
households headed by women, and among households with many children.  In many households
those categories overlap, aggravating the situation.  The differences in poverty between Budapest
and the rest of the country can be explained entirely by the differences in the socio-economic and
demographic composition of the population.
Among the non-poor,  a new socio-economic group is emerging-the  sole proprietors-
who have successfully taken  advantage of the private sector opportunities  since transition  and
who are enjoying the highest level of living and the lowest poverty.  At the other extreme are the
unemployed, especially households where the head is unemployed, and those who must rely on
child care benefits as main source of income.  They too  are a rapidly emerging group, but with
high poverty rates, and they are likely to become a growing concern in targeting the social safety
net.
38The poverty gap is not very large in Hungary, and reflects a very dense distribution of
living standard between mean household expenditure and one half the mean.  It also points at a
significant degree of success of the social safety net in preventing pockets of deep poverty (the
sole  exception are the unemployed, particularly if they have ceased to  receive unemployment
benefits.)  However, there remains scope for improved targeting of the different components of
the social safety net.
IV.  The Beneficiaries  of the Social Safety Net
For this study we have distinguished six components of the social safety net:  pensions,
unemployment benefits, family allowance, child care allowance, social assistance and child care
fee (see section 1).  Each of those has a set of specific objectives and attempts to reach different
households.  It is not  surprising therefore that  the percentage of households receiving a  given
transfer varies widely across different categories of households (Table 14).
All pensioner households of course receive pensions, but so do about one fourth of all
other  socio-economic  groups.  The  receipt  of  pensions  in  non-pensioner households  arises
because of the possibility of retirement by one household member while the head continues to
work.  Recipients of pensions are concentrated in villages and in one-person households.  Among
the latter, 88% of single female adults are pensioners.  We noted earlier that poverty among them
is higher than average and this is explained by the amount of pension they receive:  this amount
(126,620  HUF/year) is 30%  lower than the average,  and  14% less than the  average  pension
received by single male adults (Table 15).
The second most commonly received social transfer, by 44% of households, is the family
allowance. The family allowance is paid for all children, starting at the 13th week of pregnancy
until the child's 16th birthday (20th birthday if the child is in full-time education).  This includes
the maternity allowance which prior to  1993 was paid out separately.  Families with per capita
income below twice the minimum  pension also receive a supplementary allowance.  The coverage
of households with children is virtually perfect, reaching 99% or 100% in all but one category of
39households.  That category is one adult with children, where  a mere 4% of households do not
receive the allowance.
Table 14.  Recipients of social transfers.
l____________  Percent of households receiving
Pension  Unemployment  Family  Child care  Social  Child  Any social
benefit  allowance  allowance  assistance  care fee  transfer
Below min. pension  59.9  27.0  48.4  11.0  39.0  3.9  96.9
Btwn min. pension and 2/3
of mean  hhold exp.  64.5  21.3  39.6  7.5  27.6  3.9  96.2
Btwn 2/3 of mean hhold exp
and subsistence  min.  57.0  16.0  43.0  7.7  23.8  4.8  94.6
Above  subsistence  min.  41.4  12.7  47.3  6.3  18.7  4.9  85.2
Budapest  51.2  8.1  38.0  6.6  16.0  1.9  86.7
Towns  48.7  15.7  47.5  6.6  22.5  5.4  90.8
Villages  56.8  21.4  44.4  8.4  27.9  5.4  94.1
I Maleadult  53.1  10.0  - - 11.4  - 65.7
I Female adult  88.2  1.3  - - 20.0  - 90.4
1 Adult with children  13.5  11.9  96.4  11.6  44.7  3.4  98.4
2+ Adults  67.8  15.9  19.4  0.2  17.5  0.4  87.1
2 Adults with 1-2 children  8.8  22.7  98.9  22.0  27.5  14.4  99.9
2 Adults with 3 children  8.7  19.3  100.0  39.3  52.4  24.6  100.0
2 Adults with 4+ children  7.5  31.5  100.0  46.7  68.1  21.1  100.0
3+ Adults with 1-2  children  39.4  26.9  99.4  11.0  33.7  7.1  99.8
3+ Adults with 3+ children  52.9  39.4  100.0  35.6  74.0  15.1  100.0
Permanent  employee  27.3  16.8  64.0  9.6  22.8  6.3  85.5
Temporary  employee  27.5  24.4  61.4  3.2  50.6  5.9  95.9
Self employed  24.2  15.2  70.3  12.2  17.4  5.2  84.5
Sole  proprietor  22.8  8.3  65.4  7.9  25.9  5.9  81.9
Unemployed  26.4  90.3  66.5  18.2  38.3  12.0  97.7
Pensioner  99.9  5.0  5.7  0.6  20.9  0.2  100.0
Child care  receiver  23.7  28.3  100.0  63.0  47.6  40.1  100.0
Other  45.0  32.6  41.5  8.5  28.5  6.3  86.8
All  52.2  16.2  44.3  7.2  23.1  4.6  911
40Table 15. Average amount of social transfers (HUF/year) received by recipient households.
Pension  Unemployment  Family  Child care  Social  Child  All social
benefit  allowance  allowance  assistance  care fee  transfers
Below min. pension  135,857  82,483  68,014  48,844  26,539  81,772  160,551
Btwn min. pension and 2/3  162,054  78,504  68,454  42,647  19,572  62,013  165,779
of mean hhold  exp.
Btwn 2/3 of mean hhold  179,959  80,638  68,129  40,890  17,377  74,614  164,504
exp. and subsistence  min.
Above  subsistence  min.  200,310  79,427  65,361  42,347  16,343  105,151  158,353
Budapest  201,857  100,743  61,961  38,162  26,663  199,678  167,932
Towns  183,024  76,346  66,791  41,616  18,983  73,128  158,311
Villages  165,529  77,977  69,644  44,746  14,695  77,417  163,420
I Male adult  146,802  7,472  - - 13,215  - 132,444
I Female adult  126,620  88,884  - - 8,511  - 126,672
I Adult with children  95,477  68,193  66,515  40,415  23,587  59,954  104,093
2+ Adults  212,589  79,557  47,181  39,468  17,658  252,459  195,428
2 Adults with 1-2 children  123,884  83,546  59,052  40,974  14,646  79,552  113,285
2 Adults with 3 children  91,877  77,466  133,604  45,567  24,663  90,041  209,485
2 Adults with 4+ children  48,727  60,614  198,800  46,543  43,921  70,037  287,935
3+ Adults with 1-2  children  148,954  76,009  76,185  46,398  23,340  74,550  173,541
3+ Adults with 3+ children  141,641  83,475  155,658  36,509  59,963  86,950  333,952
Permanent employee  151,464  73,128  65,725  42,989  17,300  89,818  128,019
Temporary  employee  141,369  55,363  65,238  30,525  30,213  50,203  116,467
Self employed  147,036  67,379  64,731  34,190  17,618  107,136  123.224
Sole  proprietor  87,712  61,447  78,301  68,426  36,777  51,438  115,196
Unemployed  114,801  95,532  76,659  43,169  30,602  77,566  201,139
Pensioner  197,412  80,453  69,738  38,450  14,255  90,954  208,597
Child care receiver  123,848  98,997  84,437  38,680  16,355  59,666  197,858
Other  112,728  93,578  65,379  48,421  45,654  65,656  149,309
All  179,928  79,775  66,962  42,289  18,207  86,112  162,238
The child care allowance is paid to mothers on part-time or full-time leave from work,
until the third birthday of the child (10th birthday if the child is disabled).  This allowance is
41received by 7% of  households.  It  is concentrated  among the permanent employees, the  self-
employed, and the unemployed (and, by definition, in the "child care receiver" group).
The child care fee is also paid to mothers who stay at home, but  there is an eligibility
condition that they must have at least one full year of social security contributions.  Almost 5% of
households receive this fee, but here the concentration is more even across the socio-economic
groups.  Only households with an unemployed head receive it in higher proportion (and, again of
course, the "child care receiver" group).
Unemployment  benefits are  received by  16.2% of  households, and  by 90% of  those
where the head is unemployed.  Almost 30% of households whose main source of income is child
care benefits also receive unemployment benefits.  There is also a concentration of beneficiaries in
households with more than two adults and/or more than 3 children.  This suggests an unfortunate
coincidence  of  large  household  size  and  broken  links  with  the  labor  market-both  strong
determinants of poverty. 8 Unemployment benefits are paid out at a much higher rate in villages
(21%) than in towns (16%) or in Budapest (8%).  However, the average amount of the benefit by
recipient household is higher in Budapest than elsewhere.
Lastly, social assistance is received by 23% of households although in terms of money it
is the least important social transfer (18,207 HUF/year per recipient household).  This is cause for
concern since social assistance is the only component of the social safety net in Hungary which is
explicitly geared towards alleviating poverty.  (This does not mean of course that other transfers,
such as unemployment benefits, do not in fact alleviate poverty even though it is not their stated
objective-see  further  below.)  The  distribution  of  social assistance  over  different  types  of
households is quite uneven.  While generally it is higher in groups with high poverty incidence,
there are exceptions.
g  One can surmiise  that the existence  of large households  in some cases is itself the result of unemployment,
whereby  unemployed  adults  join households  to take advantage  of economies  of scale in consumption.
42In view of the poverty alleviation objective of social assistance, we have undertaken a
more detailed analysis of the recipients, which revealed some distinct concentrations:
*  geographically: 85% of recipients live in towns or villages; the regional concentration
is strongest in the North;
*  household  composition:  18% of recipients are  single adult  households  (with  or
without children), even though such households make up only 8% of the population;
among households with two or more adults, beneficiaries are not concentrated among
those  with  many children, even though  such households have well above  average
poverty  rates;  however,  the  amount  of  assistance  received  does  increase  with
household size;
*  gender of head of household:  one third of social assistance beneficiaries are female
headed households (who are 23% of all households);
- education:  social assistance recipients are found among all education groups, roughly
in proportion to their population share, except that households where the head has
less than primary education are overrepresented and those where the head has college
or university education are underrepresented;
- socio-economic status:  more than half of social assistance recipients are households
where  the head  is a  permanent employee (such  households are two  thirds  of  all
households,  but  the  poverty  incidence among them  is quite  low);  pensioner and
temporary  employee  households  are  the  most  overrepresented  among  social
assistance recipients; most notably, 26% of sole proprietor households receive social
assistance, even though this is the richest group with the lowest poverty incidence
(they receive an average 36,777 HUF/year-twice  the average-which  attests to the
difficulty of means testing for this category);
*  unemployment:  22% of social assistance beneficiaries are households where there is
an unemployed person (who are 17% of all households).
How  Well Targeted To  The Poor Are  Social  Transfers?  About 60%  of households
below the minimum pension receive a pension.  The figure rises to 65% for households between
the minimum pension and the relative poverty line, and declines thereafter.  The average pension
received by poor households is 135,857 HUF/year, which is well above the minimum pension, but
the amount contributes of course to the expenditure of the entire household and is not sufficient
to raise every recipient household above the poverty line on an equivalent adult basis.  In contrast,
43the  average  pension  received  by  a  household  above  the  subsistence  minimum is  200,310
HUF/year.  Thus a higher percentage of poor households receive pensions, but the amount they
receive is lower (which of course partly explains their poverty).  The concentration coefficient of
pensions is -0.06, which indicates that pensions in Hungary contribute to  reducing inequality in
the distribution of living standards in both an absolute and relative way.
Unemployment  benefits  are  strongly  targeted  to  the  poor:  27%  of  the  poorest
households receive them, against only 13% of non-poor households.  The average annual benefit
is 80,000 HUF and does not vary much by expenditure level of the recipient.  This means that
unemployment benefits  make  a  strong  contribution to  equalizing the  distribution  of  living
standards (as reflected by a concentration coefficient of-0. 11).
The family allowance is a universal benefit, and neither its incidence of receipt nor the
amount received varies with the expenditure level of the recipient household.  Its distribution is
thus flat (concentration coefficient = +0.04) which means that it reduces inequality in a relative
way only.
There is a marked difference in the incidence patterns of the child care allowance and the
child care fee.  Both are paid to mothers who stay away from work, but the allowance is a fixed
amount, while the fee is a proportion (65-75%) of the previous wage and it requires at least one
full year of previous work and social security contributions.  As a result, the child care allowance
is a progressive social transfer, while the child care fee is strongly regressive.  The allowance is
received by 11% of households below the minimum pension, against 7% for other households,
and the average amount received by poor households is higher (because they have more children).
The concentration coefficient is -0.05.  In contrast, the child care fee is received more by better-
off households and the average amount they receive is higher.  The concentration coefficient is
+0.22.  There is also an unusual regional pattern of incidence to the child care fee.  Fewer than
2% of households in Budapest receive it against 5.4% of households elsewhere in the country, but
the amount received in Budapest is almost three times as high as in other towns.
44Lastly, social assistance is well targeted towards the poor:  39% of households below the
minimum pension benefit from social assistance, against 19% of household above the subsistence
minimum. In addition, the amounts received by the poorest households are larger.  The amounts
are especially high for households with 3 or more children.  In all, social assistance reduces the
inequality of the distribution of living standards both in absolute and relative terms-it  has the
highest negative concentration coefficient of any social transfer (-0.16). However, as we pointed
out  earlier, there  are a  few anomalies, such as the high amounts  received by sole proprietor
households.
Table  16. Unemployment  and social  assistance.
Percent  of households  Percent  of  poor  households  receiving  social
receiving  social  assistance
assistance
Below  minimum  Below  2/3 of  mean
pension  expenditure
(6,400  HUF/mo)  (10,129  HUF/mo)
Unemployed  head  with
unemployment  benefits  37.0  43.4  45.1
Unemployed  head  without
unemployment  benefits  50.9  63.2  63.9
Other  unemployed  household
member  with  unemployment  26.3  41.1  35.8
benefits
Other  unemployed  household
member  without  unemployment
benefits  34.2  49.1  40.6
All  31.0  46.0  40.6
The relation between unemployment and social assistance is of particular importance, both
because of the concentration of poverty in households where there is unemployment and because
social assistance is meant to fill the gap when unemployment benefits run out.  Roughly one in
three households where there is an unemployed person receives social assistance, and the ratio is
higher when the household no longer receives benefits.  As Table 16 shows, the program is more
successful when the unemployed person is the head of household.  In the latter situation, when the
household is poor and unemployment benefits have run out, two out of three cases receive social
45assistance. However, when the unemployed person is another household member, fewer than one
in two poor households receive social assistance.
The social assistance program thus  reaches 40-50%  of the unemployed poor,  but  this
targeting needs to be improved if social assistance aims to serve as safety net of the last resort.
The poverty figures suggest that the end of unemployment benefits still causes a significant rise in
poverty even after receipt of social assistance.  In addition to better targeting, amounts paid out
may  also  need  to  be  increased  since  social  assistance  received  by  households  where
unemployment benefits have run out  is often less than  half the amount  of the unemployment
benefit.  It is argued below that such increases are feasible within a fixed budget, by eliminating
beneficiaries in the upper half of the distribution.
Looking  at the social safety net in its entirety, 91% of Hungarian  households  receive
one or more transfers, for an average amount of 162,238 HUF/year.  Among households below
either the minimum pension or the relative poverty line, 96% receive a social transfer, and the
coverage of the system as a whole is 100% for any household with children (when there is only
one adult, it is 98%).
This is a remarkable achievement, and such pervasive coverage of the social safety net is
exceptional even  among formnerly  socialist  economies.  However,  as  we  pointed  out  in  the
introduction,  and  as  is  discussed in  detail in  World  Bank  (1995),  such  system is  extremely
expensive and in Hungary's current economic situation, it is no longer sustainable.  The key issue
is hence how to  improve the targeting of the system towards the truly needy, by reallocating
resources and by changing eligibility  rules.  These questions are addressed in the remainder of this
report.
46Table 17. Average amount of social transfers (HUF/year) per household (recipient and non-recipient).
Pension  Unemployment  Family  Child care  Social  Child  All social
benefit  allowance  allowance  assistance  care fee  transters
Below min. pension  81,365  22,286  32,949  5,357  10,339  3,221  155,517
Btwn min. pension and 2/3
of mean hhold exp.  104,536  16,742  27,137  3,205  5,411  2,416  159,448
Btwn 2/3 of mean hhold
exp. and subsistence  min.  102,500  12,905  29,318  3,168  4,141  3,589  155,620
Above subsistence  min.  82,958  10,084  30,910  2,688  3,061  5,204  134,905
Budapest  103,267  8,175  23,535  2,504  4,275  3,782  145,538
Towns  89,057  12,016  31,697  2,738  4,274  3,915  143,697
Villages  94,101  16,696  30,946  3,756  4,106  4,207  153,812
1  Male adult  77,929  7,501  - - 1,512  - 87,039
I Female adult  111,645  1,120  - - 1,700  - 114,466
I Adult with children  12,879  8,107  64,111  4,682  10,544  2,059  102,362
2+ Adults  144,232  12,617  9,152  74  3,089  969  170,135
2 Adults with 1-2 children  10,896  18,960  58,403  9,006  4,031  11,444  112,740
2 Adults with 3 children  7,985  14,919  133,604  17,894  12,934  22,149  209,485
2 Adults with 4+ children  3,649  19,068  198,800  21,733  29,914  14,772  287,935
3+ Adults with 1-2 children  58,687  20,478  75,757  5,106  7,864  5,274  173,166
3+ Adults with 3+ children  74,969  32,893  155,658  12,995  44,345  13,091  333,952
Permanent  employee  41,334  12,266  42,096  4,114  3,944  5,652  109,406
Temporary  employee  38,922  13,512  40.069  981  15,284  2,971  111,740
Self employed  35,520  10,238  45,511  4,170  3,068  5,571  104,078
Sole proprietor  19,999  5,072  51,223  5,430  9,535  3,031  94,291
Unemployed  30,352  86,268  50,965  7,870  11,734  9,324  196,514
Pensioner  197,197  4,009  3,985  219  2,973  175  208,558
Child care receiver  29,334  27,980  84,437  24,364  7,787  23,956  197,858
Other  50,707  30,542  27,132  4,118  13,026  4,056  129,581
All  93,986  12,926  29,662  3,065  4,212  3,995  147,847
47Table 18. Social transfers as a percentage of household expenditure and disposable income (all households).
Percent  of expenditure  Percent  of
disposable
___________  _____  ____  _______  __  _________  __________incom  e
Pension  Unemployment  Family  Child care  Social  Child  All minus  All social  All social
._________  benefit  allowance  allowance  assistance  care fee  pensions  transfers  transfers
Below min. pension  76.6  13.3  16.2  3.0  6.7  1.6  40.8  117.4  66.2
Btwn min. pension and 2/3 of
mcan hhold exp.  64.2  6.8  9.1  1.1  2.3  0.8  20.2  84.4  56.3
Between  2/3 of mean hhold exp.
and subsistence  min.  43.3  3.8  7.2  0.8  1.3  0.9  14.1  57.4  44.2
Above  subsistence  min.  21.1  2.0  4.9  0.4  0.6  0.7  8.6  29.7  27.5
Budapest  43.2  2.8  5.0  0.6  1.2  0.5  10.1  53.3  36.4
Towns  37.4  3.7  7.5  0.7  1.5  0.8  14.3  51.7  36.4
Villages  40.8  5.3  7.6  1.0  1.5  1.0  16.4  57.2  40.6
I Male adult  52.4  5.5  - - 1.3  - 6.9  59.3  47.0
I Female adult  83.3  0.8  - - 1.4  - 2.2  85.5  72.3
I Adult with children  3.2  8.2  22.9  2.4  5.0  0.8  34.3  41.5  34.9
2+ Adults  51.9  4.1  2.3  0.0  1.1  0.1  7.5  59.4  42.1
2 Adults  with 1-2 children  3.0  5.7  14.1  2.5  1.1  2.6  26.0  29.0  24.2
2 Adults with 3 children  1.7  4.5  29.9  4.0  3.2  3.9  45.5  47.3  39.4
2 Adults with 4+ children  1.1  4.6  48.1  5.3  7.0  3.5  68.5  69.6  58.9
3+ Adults with 1-2  children  12.1  5.2  15.1  1.1  1.6  1.0  24.1  36.1  30.3
3+ Adults with 3+ children  17.1  7.6  35.9  2.9  11.6  3.2  61.2  78.3  60.0
Permanent  employee  10.5  3.2  9.3  1.0  1.0  1.0  15.5  26.1  22.2
ITcmpoiary  eiployce  16.7  4.8  14.5  0.2  7.3  0.7  27.6  44.3  37.4
Self employed  8.6  2.4  8.7  1.2  0.7  0.9  13.9  22.6  23.3
Sole  proprietor  3.5  1.2  8.1  1.1  1.7  0.7  12.7  16.2  16.7
Unemployed  10.9  33.4  16.3  2.6  4.9  3.2  60.4  71.2  70.1
Pensioner  95.9  1.5  1.3  0.1  1.4  0.0  4.3  100.2  86.8
Child care receiver  5.8  9.0  28.8  10.2  3.3  8.0  59.3  65.1  59.8
Other  22.4  12.2  7.2  0.9  6.7  1  .0  28.1  50.5  40.3
All  39.9  4.1  7.0  08  14  0.8  14.2  54.1  37.9
48In order to assess possibilities for reallocation of funds, is useful to  know how much the
current system contributes to the level of living of different types of households.  Tables 14 and
15 showed respectively the incidence of recipients and the amounts received.  Tables 17 and 18
combine  this  information to  show  respectively the  average  amount  of  a  given transfer  per
household, i.e. recipient and non-recipient, and the relative contribution this makes to covering
the expenditure of the households in question.  The social safety net in Hungary  represents 54%
of  the expenditure  of  an average household,  and provides 38% of its income.  This is a very
high figure, even for a post-socialist economy (in Poland, for example, the equivalent figure for
expenditure is 45%).  Pensions are the lion's share (74%) of this, and by themselves contribute
40%  to  household  expenditure.  The  family allowance contributes  7%,  and  unemployment
benefits 4%.  The remaining benefits constitute about 3% of household expenditure.
There are of course  large  differences in the  relative importance of  social transfers  for
different  categories  of  households.  For  pensioners,  they  cover  100%  of  expenditure,  for
permanent employees about one fourth, and for households where the head is unemployed almost
three fourths.  As expected, this share also rises with the number of children in the household.
From the perspective of poverty, the key question is whether the social safety net covers
more of household expenditure for the poor than the non-poor.  This is one way of judging the
progressivity of the system.  In total, the social safety net is indeed very progressive, representing
117% of the expenditure of the poorest households, and 30% of the expenditure of the non-poor,
for a ratio of 3.9:1 (Table 18).  The equivalent figures for income are 66% and 27%-a  ratio of
2.4:1-so  the progressivity remains regardless of whether household expenditure or income is
used to  measure the  living standard of households.  The respective concentration  coefficients
are-0.05  and -0.02, so that the social safety net in Hungary contributes to  equalizing both the
distributions of household income and expenditure, in both a relative and absolute way.  (As we
discussed at length in section 2, there  are possible reporting problem in the Household Budget
Survey data.  The fact that  for some poor  the  sum of social transfers exceeds their  reported
expenditure is an indication of this.  This may affect especially the elderly and others who may
49have difficulty remembering and/or recording expenditures.)  Table 19 shows various indicators of
progressivity, by  type  of  social transfer.  This  shows  consistently that  social assistance  and
unemployment benefits are the most pro-poor transfers, while the child care fee is the least pro-
poor transfer.
Table 19. Poor-to-non-poor ratios of social transfers.
Pension  Unemployment  Family  Child care  Social  Child  All social
benefit  allowance  allowance  assistance  care fee  transters
Recipients of social transfers
(Table 14)  1.44  2.13  1.02  1.75  2.09  0.80  1.14
Amount received  per
recipient  household
(Table 15)  0.67  1.04  1.04  1.15  1.62  0.78  1.01
Amount  per household
(Table 17)  0.98  2.21  1.07  1.99  3.38  0.62  1.15
Share of household
expenditures
(Table 18)  3.63  6.65  3.31  7.50  1  1.17  2.29  3.95
Note:  Ratios are for households below the minimum pension relative to households above the subsistence
minimum.
Targeting  efficiency.  While the  results cited  so  far  indicate a  reasonable amount  of
success of the Hungarian transfer system in reaching the poor, they provide no indication of the
cost at which this result is achieved.  An analysis of the cost effectiveness of the transfer system is
outside the scope of this paper, but the pension system is analyzed in detail in World Bank (1995).
We show in Tables 20 and 21 partial measures of targeting efficiency, which try to  assess how
much money is spent in order to  help a poor person.  The main shortcoming is that we do not
have information on administrative costs, which in principle need to be added to the amount of
transfers to compare different parts of the system.
Table 20 shows first the total amount of a given transfer divided by the total  number of
people in the country who were poor before receiving the transfer (ex-ante poor).  This is a broad
measure of the cost of reaching one eligible poor person, whereby the cost includes leakage, i.e.
transfers going to non-poor.  For comparison, the second column shows the average amount of a
50transfer actually received by the  ex-ante poor,  i.e., it excludes the  cost  of leakage from  the
numerator and the denominator is ex-ante poor recipients only (as opposed to all ex-ante poor).
Table 20.  Average transfer per ex-ante poor person (HUF/year).
Below minimum pension  Below 2/3 of mean expenditure
l____________________  (6,400 HUF/mo)  (10,129 HUF/mo)
Average transfer  Average transfer  Average transfer  Average transfer
paid out per poor  received by poor  paid out per poor  received by poor
person  person  person  person
Pension  126,485  101,576  75,515  89,046
Unemployment benefit  56,225  31.674  15,824  25.347
Family allowance  102,768  21.727  30.606  18.787
Child care allowance  20,825  10,483  4.144  10.584
Social assistance  27,186  12,059  5,690  8,123
Child care fee  28,634  22.478  5,463  19,110
All social transfers  132,940  85,646  89,794  71,615
Ideally,  under  perfect  targeting  towards  the  poor,  leakage would  be  zero  and  both
columns would be  identical.  In practice, the second column should be larger than the first for
poverty-oriented programs, indicating that the transfer of funds is more efficient at the level of the
ultimate poor beneficiaries than for the potential target group as a whole.  As Table 20 shows, no
transfer meets this condition when the minimum pension is the poverty line, but the condition is
met by all transfers but the family allowance if the higher poverty line is used.  All other things
being equal, targeting is more likely to succeed when the poverty line is increased.
Table 20 also shows that large differences exist in the "cost"  of helping a poor person.
Including the cost of leakage, the pension system spends 126,485 HUF per ex-ante poor person
(below minimum pension) while the child care allowance system spends 20,825 HUF per poor
person.  Per poor recipient, the corresponding figures are 101,576 HUF and  10,483 HUF.  The
wide differences between the two columns reflect that most of Hungary's transfer programs are
not explicitly aimed to  help the poor, and that hence "leakage" is large (see next section).  The
51figures also indicate the enormous differences in amounts actually transferred to the poor.  For
example, the  unemployment  benefit  transfers  31,764  HUF  per  poor  recipient,  while  social
assistance transfers only 12,059 HUF per poor recipient.  Clearly, the contribution made by each
program to closing the poverty gap will differ widely (see next section).
An alternative way of looking at the cost of reaching the poor is to  ask how many poor
people are helped per Forint  spent on social transfers (where, again, ideally this should include
administrative costs)-in  other words, what is the poverty impact of different transfer programs
after normalizing for  the  size of the  program.  Table 21  shows three  progressively narrower
measures.  First is the number of (ex-ante) poor  per  I  million HUF spent on  a given transfer
program (this is simply the inverse of the first column of Table 20), and shows the size of the
potential target group.  Next, the table shows the number of ex-ante poor reached by the given
transfer per 1 million HUF spent, and, finally, the number of poor lifted above the poverty line as
a result.
Table 21. Average  number  of ex-ante poor (below  2/3 of mean  expenditure)  helped  per I million  HUF  of transfers.
Average  number  of poor  Average  number  of poor  Average  number  of poor
people  recipients  recipients  lifted  out of
_______________________  ~~~~~~~~~~~~povertv
Pension  13.2  9.6  5.8
Unemployment  benefit  63.2  25.3  8.7
Family  allowance  32.7  23.5  8.9
Child  care  allowance  241.3  41.2  11.7
Social  assistance  175.8  66.7  8.6
Child  care  fee  183.1  18.1  6.9
All  social  transfers  11.1  11.0  6.4
Per 1 million  HUF spent, the most poor people (66.7) are reached by social assistance, but
since the amounts transferred  per poor person are much lower (see Table 20), very few (8.6)
people are lifted out of poverty.  The child care allowance reaches 41 poor people per 1 million
HUF spent, while all other programs reach 25 people or less.  As is to be expected, the lowest
52number of poor people reached or the highest cost per poor person, is observed in the pension
system, because it transfers the highest amounts and has no poverty orientation.
Per  1 million  HUF spent, the child care allowance program is the most efficient at lifting
people  out  of poverty, even though  this program is not  specifically oriented towards  poverty
alleviation. Three programs (unemployment benefits, family allowance and social assistance) are
equally efficient at lifting poor people out of poverty-doing  so for about 9 people per 1 million
HUF  spent,  i.e. at  an  average  cost  of  111,111  HUF  (excluding  administrative costs).  The
pervasiveness-and  success-of  the Hungarian transfer system as a whole is highlighted by the
fact that it spends 1 million HUF per  11.1 ex-ante poor people in the country and reaches, in one
way or another,  11 of those, and lifts an average of 6.4 of them out  of poverty.  This success,
however, does not come cheaply.  Each poor person lifted out of poverty requires 156,250 HUF
of transfers on average (again, excluding administrative costs).  This has to be compared against
the average poverty gap of 19,680 HUF.  This means that the average transfer per poor person
lifted out  of poverty is eight times the poverty gap, i.e., eight times the minimum amount that
would be needed under perfect targeting. This is due to targeting failure (leakage) as well as the
fact that most transfers do not explicitly attempt to reach only the poor.  However, even for social
assistance, which does try to reach the poor, the cost per poor person lifted out of poverty is still
1  16, 279 HUF, or about six times the average poverty gap.
V.  Closing the Poverty  Gay
The success of a social transfer system is not only measured by the degree to which the
benefits are received by the poor  (see  previous  section), but  also  by the  extent  to  which it
contributes to closing the poverty gap.  If the gap is completely closed for a household, then the
social transfer system has successfully lifted this household out of poverty by raising its income
level,  and  the  expenditure  level  made  possible  by  this,  from  below  to  above  the  poverty
benchmark.  This is an important element of the external efficiency of the social safety net, but of
course not the only element.  In other words, the ultimate objective of a social safety net should
53not be to lift all people out of poverty in all circumstances.  Apart from the fiscal implications of
such objective, it would have many undesirable incentive effects.
The extent to which the social safety net reduces the poverty gap depends on the extent to
which transfers go to people or households who are poor prior to the receipt of the given benefit
and on the amount of the benefit in relation to the poverty gap.  We now look at each of these
two elements in tum.  Table 22 shows the extent to which transfers are received by households
who were poor before they received the transfer (ex-ante targeting).  Of all transfers, pensions go
to the largest degree to households who were poor prior to the receipt of the pension.  This is not
surprising since pensions are large absolute amounts and constitute the major income source for
most recipient households.  Of the  other transfers, unemployment benefits go  to  ex-ante poor
households to the highest degree:  27% of recipient households fell below the minimum pension,
and 57% were below 2/3  of mean expenditure, prior to  the receipt of unemployment benefits.
The pattern is similar for the other transfers:  slightly more than 10% of recipients were below
minimum  pension, another 25% were between the minimum pension and the relative poverty line
prior to the receipt of the transfer in question.
Table 22.  Ex-ante  targeting  of  social  transfers  (households).
Below minimum  Betveen minimum  Betveen 2/3 of mean  Above  All
pension  pension and 2/3 of  household  expenditure  subsistence
mean household  and subsistence  minimum
expenditure  minimum
Pension  66.9%  14.6%  10.2%  8.2%  100.0%
Unemployment  benefit  26.6%  30.2%  23.2%  20.0%  100.0%
Family allowance  12.8%  25.6%  29.5%  32.2%  100.0%
Child care allowance  13.2%  26.7%  29.6%  30.6%  100.0%
Social  assistance  11.0%  26.44%  32.3%  30.3%  100.0%
Child care fee  11.5%  25.4%  33.7%  29.4%  100.0%
Allsocialtransfers  50.7%  17.1%  I  15.3%  17.0%  100.0%
_~~  ~  =
While these figures indicate a fair degree of success in ex-ante targeting, they also show
that a substantial degree of leakage occurs, i.e. the existence of beneficiaries of social transfers
54who were not poor before they received the transfer.  Looking at non-pension transfers, Table 22
indicates that  30% of more of current recipients of social transfers in Hungary were  not poor
(above the subsistence minimum) even before they received the transfer.  Only in the case of
unemployment benefits, is the figure lower (20%).  Table 23 indicates the amount of money this
represents:  from  16% to  38% of  all transfers  go to  households who were  not  poor  (above
subsistence minimum) prior to the receipt of the transfer.  If one uses the relative poverty line (2/3
of mean household expenditure) as benchmark rather than the subsistence minimum, the leakage
represents from 36% to 65% of funds.  This suggests that there is significant room in the system
for reallocation in favor of the poor.
Table 23. Ex-ante targeting of social transfers  (amounts of moneyI).
Below minimum  Between  minimum  Between  2/3 of mean  Above  All
pension  pension and 2/3 of  household  expenditure  subsistence
mean household  and subsistence  minimum
expenditure  minimum
Pension  73.6%  12.1%  7.8%  6.5%  100.0%
Unemployment  benefit  36.5%  27.5%  20.0%  16.0%  100.0%
Family allowance  18.4%  25.8%  28.5%  27.3%  100.0%
Child care allowance  14.7%  29.0%  27.9%  28.5%  100.0%
Social assistance  25.1%  29.1%  22.3%  23.5%  100.0%
Child care fee  13.0%  21.6%  27.7%  37.7%  100.0%
All social transfers  64.2%  14.5%  10.6%  10.6%  100.0%
In March  1995, the Government of Hungary  announced a  series of  reform measures,
which directly address some of these concerns.  They include the introduction of means-testing
for the  family allowance, which, if implemented effectively, could  reduce the  leakage in that
component significantly. The child care fee and the child care allowance were to be abolished and
replaced by a new means-tested allowance.  The effect  of this  on poverty is not immediately
obvious.  In the next section we explain the Government's measures in more detail and simulate
the impact they will have on poverty.
55Other measures could also be envisaged.  In the case of the family allowance, the upper
age  limits (16  years,  and  20  years  for  full-time students)  seem  excessively generous,  and  a
reduction could free up resources for targeted programs.  The Government's reforms have made a
start in this direction, by reducing the age limit to  6 years if there is one child and 2  or more
earners in the household.  It  would  also be  possible to  tax the family allowance as  ordinary
income.  The progressivity of tax rates would  ensure that  in  net terms a  larger share  of the
allowances would go to the poor.
Even though social assistance is the best targeted of all social transfers, it is intended to be
available only to poor households and this is clearly not the case.  More effective means-testing
should make it fairly easy to at least screen out the richer households, and the freed-up resources
could be redistributed to the poor.  A scenario of this nature is also simulated in the next section.
In general, the role of social assistance as a poverty alleviation tool could be enhanced.  Currently,
it absorbs only 2.5%  of the total  resources  of the social safety net,  and even for the  poorest
households, it rarely represents more than 5-7% of their expenditure.  The forgoing analysis has
shown that  some poor  people fall through  the cracks of the  system-its  impressive coverage
notwithstanding.  This is especially the case for households with multiple unemployed members
and/or where benefits have run out, and where poverty is very high.  Such households should be
integrated in the social assistance system.  Similarly,  the reforms of the child care benefits have the
risk of creating a small group of very poor affected households, who now are very dependent on
those benefits, and who may have no other place to turn to than social assistance.  Lastly, among
single-women pensioner households,  there  appears  to  be  a  pocket  of  poverty  where  social
assistance may also need to  intervene.  A full review of the social assistance delivery system is
obviously not within the scope of this paper, but we did want to  highlight the potential of the
system as poverty alleviation tool.
For those recipients of social transfers who are poor prior to the receipt of the transfer,
one can ask the question how many of them are moved above the poverty line as a result of the
transfer (Table 24).  Because pensions are by far the largest component of the safety net, it is not
surprising that they contribute the most to  keeping people out  of poverty:  62% of households
56who receive pensions are lifted above the poverty line (2/3 of mean expenditure) because of the
pension.
The second best poverty alleviation effect (43%) is achieved by the child care fee.  This
might at first sight be surprising given that this is the most regressive transfer in the system.  The
explanation is that the average  amount of the child care fee is quite high:  86,112 HUF/year,
because it is a wage-replacement amount.  Therefore, the absence of this amount can and does
often  make the  difference between  being poor  or  not.  The  effect  is  particularly  strong  in
Budapest, where, as we saw earlier, the child care fee is very high.  The abolition of this fee may
thus  have  some  poverty  implications,  even  though  only  a  relatively  small  percentage  of
households currently receive the fee (4.6%).  The simulations in the next section will make this
clear.
Unemployment benefits  and  the  family allowance each lift  39%  of  pre-transfer  poor
recipients out of poverty.  This figure is fairly uniform across different parts of the country, but it
varies a lot across types of households.  The proper interpretation of this requires combining the
figures in Table 24 with the data on incidence of benefits (Table 14) and with the poverty rates.  A
high poverty alleviation percentage is easier achieved in a small target  group.  For example, the
poverty alleviation effect is strongest among households with a single adult, where the percent of
beneficiaries is low.  An extreme case is the sole proprietors, where the unemployment benefit lifts
100% of recipients out  of poverty.  However,  only 8% of sole  proprietor  households receive
unemployment benefits, and, as we saw earlier, it is not a very poor group, so that any transfer is
more likely to lift the beneficiaries above the poverty line.
Vice-versa, a low poverty alleviation effect can be due to poor targeting, but also to good
targeting combined with too  low transfer amounts, especially in high poverty groups.  This is
illustrated by the effect of the unemployment benefit on temporary employee households:  they
have a high incidence of unemployment benefits, but they are one of the poorest  groups, so the
benefit leaves many of them in poverty.  This is also the case for the family allowance received by
households with many children.  In the case of households consisting of 2 adults and 3 children
57(where coverage of the allowance is 100%), 49% of those who are poor  prior to  the allowance
are lifted above the poverty line. This figure drops to 21% of households with 4 or more children,
reflecting that the amount is insufficient, so that poverty among them remains high (as we saw in
section 3).
Table 24. Poverty  alleviation  impact  of social  transfers.
Percent  of ex-ante  poor  recipient  households  who  are lifted  above  the poverty  line
(2/3  of  mean  expenditure)  as a result  of  social  transfer
Pension  Unemploymnent  -Family  Child  care  Social  Child  All social
benefit  allowance  allowance  assistance  care  fee  transfers
Budapest  68.9  36.2  34.7  43.5  16.6  78.6  65.9
Towns  62.7  41.3  43.1  29.0  17.2  37.5  61.6
Villages  58.3  38.0  37.0  24.2  11.0  40.4  57.2
I Male  adult  64.3  52.6  - - 0.0  - 61.5
I Female  adult  59.8  81.4  _  - 14.4  - 60.0
I Adult  with  children  33.7  73.0  52.7  26.9  23.8  50.1  57.2
2+Adults  66.3  44.0  36.7  - 15.5  47.2  65.8
2 Adults  with 1-2  children  47.6  40.8  41.2  35.3  19.2  51.1  55.8
2 Adults  with  3 children  11.5  14.5  49.1  30.3  3.2  36.9  57.0
2 Adults  with  4+ children  0.0  0.0  20.9  21.3  10.1  0.0  24.8
3+ Adults  with  I-2 children  46.4  24.2  35.7  21.1  11.6  34.4  51.8
3+  Adults  with  3+ children  20.3  7.0  17.8  5.7  3.2  0.0  27.4
Permanent  employee  66.9  43.9  44.3  40.1  17.7  50.0  62.1
Temporary  employee  21.2  22.1  27.7  100.0  15.7  0.0  40.0
Self  employed  47.3  29.6  29.5  13.3  9.2  38.7  49.6
Sole  proprietor  100.0  100.0  77.2  100.0  0.0  0.0  90.5
Unemployed  40.7  34.7  24.9  10.3  13.4  33.9  43.0
Pensioner  62.7  34.5  24.0  13.4  12.0  43.1  63.1
Child  care  receiver  13.7  27.8  38.2  9.5  0.0  20.1  44.6
Other  32.9  50.9  37.1  28.8  24.6  56.1  51.3
All  62.3  39.2  39.2  29.7  14.3  42.6  607
58The figures in Table 24 for social assistance are particularly interesting.  As we have seen,
social assistance is  the most  progressively distributed  transfer,  yet  it  has the  lowest  poverty
alleviation effect.  This is mainly the result of the low amounts of money per recipient household
(18,207 HUF/year on average).  This supports our earlier argument that the poverty alleviation
role of social assistance needs to be strengthened, both by increasing financial resources available
to it (from savings in other parts of the system) and by better targeting.  We gave some examples
of overlooked  groups  earlier.  Currently, social  assistance is  most  effective in  single-parent
households, where  45%  receive assistance  and  almost  one  fourth  are lifted  out  of  poverty.
Incidence is also high among households with 3+ children, but  for them social assistance only
bridges part of the poverty gap.
Of course, even where it does not lift households above the poverty line, the social safety
net can have a major impact on households' living standards.  One way to  assess this is to show
the transfers received by the poor as a fraction of the poverty gap (Table 25).  We calculated
earlier that  the  poverty  gap  is  on  average  16%  of  the  relative  poverty  line  (2/3  of  mean
expenditure).  In total, the social transfers received by the poor below this benchmark are 288%
of the (remaining) poverty gap.  This means that without the transfers, the poverty gap would be
almost 3 times larger.  The last line of Table 25 also shows how the transfers received by non-
poor people (above the subsistence minimum) compare to the poverty gap.  It tums out that they
are almost 4 times larger than the after-transfer poverty gap and larger than the transfers received
by the poor.  Even after excluding pensions, transfers received by the non-poor are still more than
the poverty gap.  In fact, the family allowances received by the non-poor would by themselves
almost be sufficient to cover the entire poverty gap.  This clearly points at the importance of the
reforms of the family allowance proposed  by the Government.  While the announced  income
benchmark is higher than the subsistence minimum (see  next section), its application holds the
potential for a significant reallocation of resources towards the poor.
59Table 25.  Social transfers and the poverty gap.
Pension  Unemployment  Family  Child care  Social  Child care  All social
benefit  allowance  allowance  assistance  fee  transfers
Social transfers received  by poor households (below 2/3 of mean expenditure)
as percentage  of poverty  gap
Budapest  230.2  28.5  40.8  4.4  15.0  1.1  320.1
Towns  189.9  32.1  56.0  7.0  11.8  4.8  301.5
Villages  162.6  32.9  50.1  6.7  9.7  5.5  267.5
I Maleadult  366.7  39.9  - - 16.7  - 423.2
I Female adult  463.0  2.2  - - 7.8  - 472.9
I Adult with children  43.9  7.2  99.6  13.5  23.2  2.5  190.0
2+ Adults  305.1  34.4  15.1  - 9.2  - 363.8
2 Adults with 1-2 children  23.6  44.1  79.2  17.6  7.0  12.4  183.9
2 Adults with 3 children  15.9  38.1  156.7  18.3  27.3  13.6  269.9
2 Adults with 4+ children  2.5  19.7  168.4  18.1  24.4  13.9  246.9
3+ Adults with 1-2 children  67.2  35.1  67.9  6.4  9.2  3.9  189 7
3+Adultswith3+children  35.1  18.8  83.0  6.5  28.0  9.9  181.3
Permanent  employee  63.9  30.9  72.5  9.0  9.5  5.3  191.0
Temporary  employee  55.3  8.5  47.2  - 19.7  0.9  131.6
Self employed  105.3  21.7  60.7  13.5  10.7  2.1  214.1
Sole  proprietor  - - 66.4  - 2.6  62.9  131.9
Unemployed  28.1  79.0  67.7  9.9  16.0  9.0  209.7
Pensioner  424.5  14.4  14.5  0.8  10.2  0.5  465.0
Child care receiver  20.4  39.1  92.4  21.4  7.8  29.6  210.7
Other  133.2  53.1  45.7  4.6  23.7  3.6  263.9
All  182.8  32.0  50.9  6.4  11.2  4.6  287.9
Social  transfers received  by non-poor  household (above subsistence  minimum)
as percentage of the povertv  gap
All  247.4  30.1  92.2  8.0  9.1  15.5  402.3
While the figures in this section indicate that social transfers in Hungary have a substantial
degree  of success in reaching the  poor,  there  remain two  problems.  First,  we have already
referred to the leakage in the system, whereby almost one third of non-pension transfers go the
60non-poor (Table 23).  Second, there remain a number of poor, even among those who do receive
social transfers.  Table 26 shows the distribution of the beneficiaries of social transfers classified
according to their poverty status after the receipt of transfers.  Clearly, the vast majority of social
transfer recipients are not  poor  after the receipt of transfers.  The tables in this  section have
indicated the  extent  to  which  the  transfer  system  contributes  to  this,  by  being targeted  to
households who are poor before the transfer and by closing partially or completely the poverty
gap  for those  who  are  poor.  Using 2/3  of  mean expenditure as  benchmark,  about  27%  of
households receiving social transfers remain poor.  This figure is a bit higher for recipients of
pensions and unemployment benefits, and a bit lower for  the recipients of family allowances.
Obviously, the remaining poor are the people on whom the social safety net needs to focus.  The
reform proposals discussed in the next section aim to contribute to this.
Table 26. Distribution of beneficiaries of social transfers (ex-post targeting).
Below minimum  Between  minirnum  Between  2/3 of mean  Above  All
pension  pension and 2/3 of  household  subsistence
mean household  expenditure and  minimum
expenditure  subsistence  minirnum
Pension  4.6%  26.1%  36.4%  32.8%  100.0%
Unemployment  benefit  6.7%  27.8%  33.0%  32.4%  100.0%
Fanily allowance  4.4%  18.9%  32.5%  44.2%  100.0%
Child care allowance  6.1%  21.9%  35.7%  36.3%  100.0%
Social assistance  6.8%  25.3%  34.4%  33.5%  100.0%
Child care fee  3.4%  17,8%  34.6%  44.2%  100.0%
Social transfers  4.3%  22.3%  34.7%  38.7%  100.0%
VI. Proposals to Modify the Social Safety Net
In March  1995, the Government of Hungary announced several proposals to modify the
social safety net.  The  main innovation  is the  introduction  of  means  testing  for  the  family
allowance and child care benefits.  The details of the proposals are as follows:
61*  an income cap for eligibility for the family allowance is introduced, equal to 25,000
HUF gross income per month per capita, prior to the receipt of the family allowance;
*  if the household contains two  wage earners and one  child, the family allowance is
payable only until the child's sixth birthday;
*  the child care allowance and the child care fee are abolished; a new child care benefit
is introduced,  equal to  the  minimum  pension,  and payable until  the child's third
birthday, in households under the income cap applicable for the family allowance.
Several  additional  modifications  are  also  proposed,  including  replacement  of  the
pregnancy allowance, introduction of a new income-supplementing allowance, and a limit to  the
receipt of unemployment benefits for a maximum of two  years (as well as changes in various
aspects of the eligibility  rules).
For the purpose of this report, we have attempted to simulate the impact of the proposals
relating to the family allowance and the child care benefits on the poverty incidence in different
types of households.  We have also simulated the effect of several additional targeting rules based
on the observed correlation between poverty and the number of children in the household, the
number of unemployed in the household, and the educational level of the head of household.
Because the government proposals were  announced in March  1995, and the HBS  data
used in this report pertain to  1993, the new income cap was adjusted to reflect inflation over this
period.  The equivalent amount in 1993 would have been 16,500 HUF of gross income per month
per  capita.  Also, the HBS  data  at our  availability consisted only of household  records,  and
individual data such as age were available only for the head of household.  This required some
approximations to simulate the effect of changes in the age limits for the family allowance.
Table 27 summarizes the results of the simulations and Tables 28 and 29 show the detailed
results  for the  reforms  of  the family allowance and  for  the  reforms  of  the  other  transfers,
respectively.  The proposal labeled "FA1" shows the results of the simulations pertaining to the
new income cap, and the new age cap for the family allowance in case of households with one
62child and two earners.  The new income cap removes the eligibility of 26% of households, i.e.
74% of households fall below the cap.  This figure is much higher though in households with
many children,  in  households  headed  by unemployed  people  or  child care  receivers,  and  in
households where the head has low education, in other words, in households where poverty is
high.  The effect of introducing the income and age eligibility caps on poverty is slight:  with the
minimum pension as benchmark, poverty incidence is unchanged in the aggregate, and with the
relative benchmark,  it rises from  25.3% to  26.5%.  Among the  very  poor,  the  effect is felt
strongest in households with 3 or more adults and 1-2 children and in households of temporary
employees.  In the  latter,  poverty  rises from  19.3% to  22.1%.  While the  situation of  such
households needs to  be  investigated further, this finding may call for  an exemption based on
employment status (temporary employees are a small but vulnerable target group).
Table  27. Poverty  and fiscal impact  of selected  reforms  of social  transfers.
Below  minimum  pension  Below  2/3 of mean  expenditure  Fiscal
(6,400 HUF/mo)  (10,129  HUF/mo)  difference
Poverty  Difference  in  Poverty  Difference  in  (O)
incidence  poverty  incidence  poverty
(%/0)  incidence  (%)  incidence
Current situation  4.5%  - 25.3%  -
Family  allowance
proposal  1  4.6%  +0.1  26.1%  +0.8  -22%
Family  allowance
proposal2  3.8%  -0.7  24.0%  -1.3  -5%
Family  allowance
proposal  3  4.3%  -0.2  25.6%  +0.3  -18%
Family allowance
proposal  4  4.3%  -0.2  25.7%  +0.4  -19%
Family allowance
proposal  5  3.5%  -1.0  23.6%  -1.7  -2%
Child  care proposal  5.2%  +0.7  26.6%  +1.3  -57%
Social  assessment
proposal  3.6%  -0.9  24.7%  -0.6  0.0
63Table 28. Poverty impact of selected reforns  of the family allowance.
A. Poverty  line = minimum pension (6,400 HUF/mo)
Actual  Family allowance  proposals  Percentage
poverty  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _of
incidence  FA  I  FA2  FA3  FA4  FA5  households
under new (%)  (difference)  (difference)  (difference)  (difference)  (difference)  benchmarkl
I Male adult  4.8  - - _  _  _  56
I Female adult  5.3  _  - - - - 81
1  Adult with I child  9.2  - -3.0  _  -1.5  4.5  85
2+ Adults  3.3  - - - - - 68
2 Adults with 1-2  children  2.8  +0.1  +0.1  - - -0.  1  79
2 Adults with 3 children  6.4  - -6.4  - -0.6  -6.4  94
2 Adults with 4+children  19.0  - -19.0  - -5.5  -19.0  100
3+ Adults with 1-2 children  6.5  +0.7  +0.7  -0.5  +0. 1  -0.8  85
3+Adultswith3+children  21.4  - -18.1  -7.8  -6.7  -18.1  100
Permanent  employee  2.6  +0.2  -0.3  -0.1  +0.1  -0.4  62
Temporary  employee  19.3  +2.8  -0.7  +2.8  -2.6  -2.6  94
Self-employed  2.0  +0.7  +0.2  +0.7  +0.4  - 77
Sole proprietor  2.0  - - - - - 65
Unemployed  17.5  - -4.6  -2.0  -2.8  -6.9  95
Pensioner  5.7  - -0.3  - - -0.3  90
Childcarereceiver  23.6  - -13.6  -3.6  - -17.2  10(
Other  9.5  - -2.7  -2.7  -4.8  -4.8  86
Lessthanprimary  13.1  - -1.9  -1.4  -3.6  -3.6  95
Primary  7.3  +0.4  -0.5  -0.  +0.4  -1.0  84
Vocational  2.9  +0.2  -0.9  +0.1  +0.2  -1.  76
Special post-primary  9.8  - - - - - 79
Secondary  grammar  1.3  _  - - - - 67
Other secondary  1.2  - - - - - 60
High  school  0.3  - -0.2  - - -0.2  46
University  0.0  - - - - - 34
All  4.5  +0.1  -0.7  -0.2  -0.2  -1.0  74
64Table 28. Poverty impact of selected reforms of the family allowance (continued).
B. Poverty  line = 2/3 of mean expenditure  (10,129 HUF/mo)
Actual  Family allowance  proposals  Percentage  of
poverty  households
incidence  FAI  FA2  FA3  FA4  FA5  under new
(0 %)  (difference)  (difference)  (difference)  (difference)  (difference)  benchmark
I Male adult  22.6  _  _  - - _  56
I Femaleadult  34.7  - - - - - 81
1 Adult with I child  24.9  +0.7  -4.9  +0.7  -4.1  -7.1  85
2+ Adults  22.5  +0.4  +0.4  +0.4  +0.4  +0.4  68
2 Adults with 1-2  children  20.4  +0.4  +0.4  +0.1  +0.2  -0.1  79
2 Adults with 3 children  29.8  - -21.5  -1.4  -3.2  -21.5  94
2 Adults with 4+ children  71.4  - -57.3  -2.5  - -57.3  100
3+ Adults with 1-2 children  29.4  +3.3  +3.3  +2.0  +2.9  +1.7  85
3+Adults with 3+children  72.7  - -31.7  -6.3  -1.5  -31.7  100
Permanent  employee  18.7  +1.0  -0.6  +0.9  +0.9  -0.7  62
Temporary  employee  51.3  - -3.0  - -2.1  -5.1  94
Self-employed  22.6  +0.7  -1.3  +0.7  +0.7  -1.3  77
Sole  proprietor  4.7  +8.7  +6.0  +8.7  +8.7  +6.0  65
Unemployed  57.4  - -11.7  -7.2  -1.2  -15.8  95
Pensioner  35.7  -0.3  -0.1  -0.7  -0.8  90
Child care receiver  54.8  - -19.8  -2.6  - -22.3  100
Other  35.6  +2.1  -1.8  +2.1  -2.3  -2.3  86
Less than primary  51.0  - -1.9  -0.6  -3.8  -3.8  95
Primary  37.3  +1.0  -3.1  +0.3  +1.0  -3.4  84
Vocational  22.7  +0.9  -0.9  +0.7  +0.9  -1.2  76
Special  post-primary  30.4  - - - - - 79
Secondarygrammar  15.1  +1.7  -0.9  +0.9  +1.7  -1.  1  67
Other secondary  12.3  +0.6  - +0.1  +0.6  -1.  1  60
High school  5.5  +0.3  +0.3  +0.3  +0.3  +0.3  46
University  5.1  +0.3  +0.3  +0.3  +0.3  +0.3  34
All  25.3  +0.8  -1.3  +0.3  +0.4  -1.7  74
Note: The family allowance  reform proposals are as follows:
FAI (government  proposal): means-testing  the family allowance at 25,000 HUF gross income per capita per month (in 1995
HUF and before  receipt of the allowance)  and instituting  an age limit of six years in families of two wage eamers and one child.
FA2: FAI plus additional 3,750  HUF/mo  per child in households  with 3 or more  children
FA3: FAI plus additional 3,750  HUF/mo per child in households  with 2 or more  unemployed  members.
FA4: FAI plus additional 3,750  HUF/mo per child in households  where head has less than primary  education.
FA5: FAI plus additional 3,750 HUF/mo per child if either children, unemployment,  or education criterion in, respectively,
FA2, FA3, or FA4 is met.
65The introduction of the income cap imples a budgetary saving of 22%, and some of these
funds could be reallocated and targeted to  high poverty groups.  (In practice, the  savings are
likely to  be  less, because  the  required means-testing will increase  administrative costs.).  The
poverty profile in section III  identified pockets of high poverty in households with  3 or more
children, in households where there are 2 or more unemployed members, and in households where
the head has less than primary education.  We have therefore simulated the effect of increasing the
family allowance for households meeting these conditions, by 3,750 HUF/mo per child.  This is a
very large increase-the  amount corresponds to that currently received from the third child on, in
two-parent  households.  The simulation results show that, in practice, such large increases may
not be needed, but it is useful to  show the upper limit of what can be achieved with indicator-
targeting based on easily observed socio-economic characteristics of households and using the
family allowance as tool.  The simulations are labeled FA2 to FA5.  The first three simulations
show the impact of an increased family allowance for each of the three conditions (3 or more
children, 2 or more unemployed, less than primary education) separately, while FA5 shows the
impact of increasing the allowance if either one of the conditions is met.
Only targeting by the number of children leads to a significant reduction in overall poverty
incidence (by 0.7 percentage points relative to the minimum  pension and by 1.3 percentage points
relative to the higher benchmark).  The other two modes of targeting are virtually poverty-neutral
in the aggregate.  Of course, different types of households are affected differently. In the case of
targeting  by the  number of  children (FA2),  poverty  in  large households  disappears  entirely,
indicating that such targeting can be very effective in alleviating poverty, but also indicating that
the  amounts in this  simulation are too  generous.  (Further  simulations could  define amounts
which, for example, reduce poverty incidence in households with 3+ children to the level found in
households with 1-2 children.)
Since there is a fairly strong positive correlation between the number of children in a
household and the number of unemployed, the FA2 scenario also leads to  poverty reduction in
households with an unemployed head.  Another target group, households with a head with less
than primary education, also benefit although to a lesser degree.
66Targeting by the  number of unemployed (FA3)  has  the strongest  effect  in the  largest
households-those  with  3+ adults, since unemployment is  concentrated  there.  Targeting by
education level (FA4) also helps these households, in addition to those with 2 adults and many
children, and of course households where the head has less than primary education.  Targeting by
education is also the  only approach  which leads to  significant poverty  reduction  among the
temporary employees.
These results suggest that a case can be made for combining the different criteria (FA5)
since this reaches all the desired target groups.  As stated earlier, the optimal amounts would need
to be determined, and the simulation in Table 28 must certainly be seen as an upper limit of what
can be achieved.  The results suggest that  significant poverty reduction  can be  achieved with
indicator targeting, and that this can be  done within the  existing limit of the family allowance
budget (in fact, a 2% savings would be achieved).  The results also suggest though that using a
family allowance, i.e. basing the  amount of social transfers  on the number of  children, is not
always efficient from the poverty perspective.  A general income supplement, or increased social
assistance may be more effective in reaching households where unemployment or low education is
the main cause of poverty.
As a  final comment on Table  28,  we  point out  that  the  pattern  of  outcomes  of  the
simulations is altered in some key places when the higher relative poverty benchmark is used.  For
example, the introduction of the income cap affects the sole proprietor households quite heavily,
more than doubling their poverty incidence.
Next to  the family allowance, the government  reform proposals affect mainly the child
care allowance and fee.  The abolishment of these and  the institution of the  new child  care
benefit increase poverty from 4.5% to  5.2% below the minimum pension, and from 25.3% to
26.6% below the relative poverty line (Table 29).  Most seriously affected are households with
many children, with unemployed heads, and, by definition, those dependent on child care benefits.
For example, in households with 2 adults and 4+ children, poverty incidence increases from 19%
67to  27%, and in households with 3+ adults and 3+ children, poverty incidence almost doubles to
40%.  There is thus a risk that this part of the reform proposal will hurt some poor groups.  The
replacement benefit appears to be too low and/or insufficiently  targeted towards the poor.  Since
the new benefit scheme would lead to fiscal savings in the order of 57%, a targeted reallocation of
some of these savings would be entirely possible.  This could be done by proposals similar to
those which were simulated in scenarios FA2 to FA5.
Altematively, as we have argued earlier, social assistance could be given a greater role in
poverty  alleviation.  It  is  currently  the  most  progressively  distributed  transfer,  and,  after
unemployment benefits, the best targeted towards the poor.  It should be possible to improve the
means-testing for social assistance, and if, for example, leakage of funds to households above the
government's  new  income  cap  could be  eliminated, it would  create  a  fund  which  could be
reoriented towards the poorest  recipients.  The amounts saved under  such scenario constitute
36% of social assistance now received by those below the relative poverty line and 136% of social
assistance  received  by  households  below  the  minimum pension.  Allocating  these  funds
proportionately to current receipts, would reduce poverty respectively by 0.6 and 0.9 percentage
points (Table 29).  It  would benefit  especially one-parent  households, very large  households,
households with unemployed heads and those dependent on child care benefits, and households
with low educated heads.
The simulation results in this section suggest that a combination of indicator targeting and
an increased role of social assistance could be very effective in Hungary in reducing the poverty
incidence in those  groups  where  it is currently highest.  The government's  current  proposals
would free up the resources to do this.
68Table 29. Poverty impact of selected reforms of child care allowance and fee, and social assistance.
A. Poverty line = minimum  pension  B.  Poverty  line = 2/3 of mean expenditure
(6,400 HUF/mo)  (10,  129  HUF/mo)
Actual  Proposal  Proposal  Actual  Proposal  Proposal
poverty  child care  social  poverty  child care  social
incidence  allowance  assistance  incidence  allowance  assistance
(%)  and fee  (difference)  (%)  and fee  (difference)
l  _______________  ______  (difference)  (difference)
1  Male adult  4.8  - -0.2  22.6  - -0.2
1  Female adult  5.3  - -0.5  34.7  - -0.5
1 Adult with I child  9.2  - -4.8  24.9  +1.4  -11
2+ Adults  3.3  - -0.6  22.5  +0.1  -0.5
2 Adults with 1-2 children  2.8  +1.0  -0.4  20.4  +3.1  -0.3
2 Adults with 3 children  6.4  +1.9  -2.0  29.8  +4.4  -3.6
2 Adults with 4+ children  19.0  +8.2  -2.6  71.4  +6.8  -5.6
3+ Adults with 1-2 children  6.5  +0.2  -1.0  29.4  +1.2  -0.7
3+ Adults with 3+ children  21.4  +18.8  -11.4  72.7  +2.4  -
Permanent employee  2.6  +0.4  -0.6  18.7  +1.8  -0.5
Temporary  employee  19.3  - -2.5  51.3  -0.5  -
Self-employed  2.0  +1.3  -0.5  22.6  +0.1  -0.4
Sole proprietor  2.0  - - 4.7  +1.0  -
Unemployed  17.5  +4.2  -3.2  57.4  +2.0  -2.5
Pensioner  5.7  +1.8  -0.8  35.7  +0.2  -0.6
Child care receiver  23.6  +5.2  -7.5  54.8  -0.2  -
Other  9.5  -2.2  -0.6  35.6  +1.6  -1.9
Less than primary  13.1  -0.2  -2.3  51.0  +1.0  -1.0
Primary  7.3  +1.4  -1.2  37.3  +1.0  -1.0
Vocational  2.9  +0.7  -1.0  22.7  +2.0  -0.6
Special post-primary  9.8  - - 30.4  +2.5  -
Secondary  grammar  1.3  +0.8  -0.2  15.1  +1.  1  -0.6
Other secondary  1.2  +0.8  - 12.3  +1.2  -0.2
High school  0.3  -0.3  -0.3  5.5  +2.0  -0.4
University  0.0  - - 5.1  - -
All  4.5  +0.7  -0.9  25.3  +1.3  -0.6
Note:  Proposal child care allowance  and fee: child care allowance  and fee are abolished; child care fee is replaced by a
payment of 6,400 HUF/mo (= minimum pension) up to the child's third birthday, if recipient household has
income less than 25,000  HUF/mo per capita (prior to the receipt of the family  allowance).
Proposal social assistance: social assistance is eliminated for households with income over 25,000 HUF/mo  per
capita (prior to the receipt of the family allowance),  and the saved funds are reallocated to the poor in proportion
to existing social assistance payments.
69ANNEX TABLES
Table  Al. Distribution  of disposable  household  income  and household  expenditure.
Ventile  Disposable  household  income  Household  expenditure
(5%  of  population)  (HUF/year)  (HUF/year)
l  l  71,045  66,163
2  101,082  86,389
3  113,658  98,017
4  122,574  108,335
5  130,629  117,051
6  137,708  125,505
7  144,465  133,640
8  151,513  140,742
9  158,202  148,453
10  164,338  156,343
11  170,905  165,492
12  178,650  174,028
13  186,886  183,285
14  195,926  194,499
15  207,869  207,062
16  220,344  221,681
17  236,186  242,000
18  258,577  269,712
19  294,229  314,074
20  408,324  496,758
Gini-coefficient  0.214  0.262
Note:  The  first  column  is the distribution  of disposable  household  income  per  equivalent  adult
over  income  ventiles  (5%  of  the population);  the second  column  is the  distribution  of
household  expenditure  per  equivalent  adult  over  expenditure  ventiles  (5%  of the
population).
70Table A2. The composition  of household  income (percentage).
Wage  Self-  Property  Social  Private  Other  Total  Mean gross  Taxes  and  Transfers  Disposable
income  employment  income  transfers  transfers  income  income  contributions  income  as a
income  (HUF/year)  percentage  of
________  ____________  ________  ________  ~~~~~~~~~~~gross  income
Budapest  61.8  6.4  0.3  28.0  2.4  1.2  100.0  520,620  21.5  1.6  76.9
Towns  56.4  9.9  0.3  29.3  3.0  1.2  100.0  490,739  17.8  1.7  80.5
Villages  46.2  15.0  0.5  34.5  2.3  1.5  100.0  445,633  13.3  1.7  85.0
I Male  adult  45.6  14.0  0.5  37.0  1.2  1.6  100.0  235,404  16.5  4.9  78.6
I Female  adult  23.3  6.6  0.8  64.3  3.4  1.6  100.0  178,059  8.0  3.1  88.9
1 Adult  with  children  53.2  5.1  0.1  29.2  11.3  1.1  100.0  350,888  15.0  1.4  83.7
2+ Adults  51.8  10.5  0.4  34.4  1.7  1.2  100.0  495,094  16.5  1.9  81.6
2 Adults  with 1-2  children  64.1  11.3  0.2  19.0  4.1  1.3  100.0  592,069  19.9  1.4  78.7
2 Adults  with 3 children  53.5  9.6  0.3  32.5  2.7  1.4  100.0  643,664  16.5  0.8  82.6
2 Adults  with 4+ children  36.7  8.0  0.0  53.2  1.0  1.1  100.0  541,688  9.4  0.4  90.2
3+ Adults  with 1-2  children  58.6  13.7  0.3  24.4  1.8  1.2  100.0  710,811  18.6  0.9  80.5
3+ Adults  with  3+ children  33.2  5.7  0.0  54.8  3.3  3.0  100.0  609,271  8.1  0.6  91.4
Below  min. pension  29.1  6.6  0.2  61.3  1.5  1.3  100.0  253,602  6.2  1.1  92.7
Btwn  min. pension  and 2/3
mean  exp.  38.5  8.6  0.2  49.9  1.7  1.1  100.0  319,448  9.6  1.7  88.6
Between  2/3  mean  exp. and
subsistence  min.  49.5  10.0  0.2  37.2  2.1  1.0  100.0  418,523  14.1  1.7  84.2
Above  subsistence  min.  61.6  12.0  0.5  21.3  3.2  1.5  100.0  634,653  21.0  1.7  77.3
71Table A2. The composition of household income (percentage) (continued).
Wage  Self-  Property  Social  Private  Other  Total  Mean  gross  Taxes  and  Transfers  Disposable
income  employment  income  transfers  transfers  income  income  contributions  income  as a
income  (HUF/year)  percentage  of
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _  _  _ _  _ _ _  _ _  _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _  _  _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _  _ _  grossro  ss  in  c o m  e
Penmanent  employee  70.7  8.2  0.3  17.1  2.6  1.2  100.0  640,724  21.7  1.4  76.9
Temporary  employee  44.6  6.9  0.4  35.5  11.7  0.9  100.0  314,576  3.8  1.I  95.1
Self employed  24.2  51.3  1.3  19.1  2.2  2.0  100.0  544,471  16.5  1.6  81.9
Sole  proprietor  24.6  60.2  0.8  12.4  1.6  0.3  100.0  758,746  24.7  1.1  74.2
Unemployed  15.5  11.9  0.2  65.9  4.1  2.4  100.0  298,214  4.6  1.4  94.0
Pensioner  4.3  9.0  0.6  83.0  1.9  1.4  100.0  251,258  1.4  2.9  95.6
Child care receiver  19.2  8.7  0.3  57.4  13.3  1.1  100.0  344,534  2.4  1.5  96.0
Other  45.3  9.7  0.6  35.3  5.4  3.6  100.0  366,944  10.9  1.4  87.6
Less than primasy  12.1  10.8  0.2  73.8  1.8  1.3  100.0  230,359  2.9  2.7  94.3
Primary  42.6  10.8  0.7  43.0  1.6  1.4  100.0  377,833  11.2  1.8  86.9
Vocational  59.1  13.1  0.3  22.6  4.0  0.9  100.0  552,667  17.4  1.5  81.1
Special  post primary  58.7  7,6  0.2  30.2  1.9  1.4  100.0  432,899  15.2  1.7  83.1
Secondary  gramnmar  56.6  10.1  0.4  28.5  2.8  1.6  100.0  518,733  18.0  1.6  80.4
Other  secondary  62.3  10.7  0.3  23.2  2.3  1.2  100.0  596,892  20.9  1.5  77.6
High school  69.2  7.8  0.2  19.2  2.3  1.2  100.0  705,002  24.4  1.7  73.9
University  68.4  8.4  0.3  18.5  2.4  1.9  100.0  815,036  26.6  1.6  71.8
All  54.1 I  10.8  0.4  30.8  2.6  1.3  100.0  480,431  17.1  1.7  81.2
..  ..  - _7
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73Table A3. The composition of social transfers (percentage).
Pension  Unemployment  Fanily  Child care  Social  Child  All social
benefit  allowance  allowance  assistance  care fee  transfers
Budapest  71.0  5.6  16.2  1.7  2.9  2.6  100.0
Towns  62.0  8.4  22.1  1.9  3.0  2.7  100.0
Villages  61.2  10.9  20.1  2.4  2.7  2.7  100.0
I Male adult  89.5  8.6  - - 1.7  - 100.0
I Female adult  97.5  1.0  - - 1.5  - 100.0
I Adult with children  12.6  7.9  62.6  4.6  10.3  2.0  100.0
2+ Adults  84.8  7.4  5.4  0.0  1.8  0.6  100.0
2 Adults with 1-2  children  9.7  16.8  51.8  8.0  3.6  10.2  100.0
2 Adults with 3 children  3.8  7.1  63.8  8.5  6.2  10.6  100.0
2 Adults with 4+ children  1.3  6.6  69.0  7.5  10.4  5.1  100.0
3+ Adults with 1-2 children  33.9  11.8  43.7  2.9  4.5  3.0  100.0
3+ Adults with 3+ children  22.4  9.8  46.6  3.9  13.3  3.9  100.0
Below  min. pension  52.3  14.3  21.2  3.4  6.6  2.1  100.0
Btwn min. pension and 2/3
meanexp.  65.6  10.5  17.0  2.0  3.4  1.5  100.0
Btwn 2/3 mean exp. and
subsistence  min.  65.9  8.3  18.8  2.0  2.7  2.3  100.0
Above subsistence  min.  61.5  7.5  22.9  92.0  2.3  3.9  100.0
Permanent  employee  37.8  11.2  38.5  3.8  3.6  5.2  100.0
Temporary  employee  34.8  12.1  35.9  0.9  13.7  2.7  100.0
Self employed  34.1  9.8  43.7  4.0  2.9  5.4  100.0
Sole proprietor  21.2  5.4  54.3  5.8  10.1  3.2  100.0
Unemployed  15.4  43.9  25.9  4.0  6.0  4.7  100.0
Pensioner  94.6  1.9  1.9  0.1  1.4  0.1  100.0
Child care receiver  14.8  14.1  42.7  12.3  3.9  12.1  100.0
Other  39.1  23.6  20.9  3.2  10.1  3.1  100.0
Less than priaray  88.9  3.7  4.3  0.3  2.4  0.4  100.0
Primary  70.8  9.0  14.8  1.5  2.9  1.1  100.0
Vocational  34.3  14.4  37.2  4.9  4.1  5.0  100.0
Special postprimasy  58.9  13.7  18.9  3.4  1.2  3.9  100.0
Secondary  grammar  65.7  7.2  21.1  1.1  3.4  1.5  100.0
Other secondary  57.2  9.6  24.4  2.4  2.1  4.3  100.0
High school  60.4  5.7  26.8  1.3  2.4  3.4  100.0
University  62.8  5.8  19.8  2.1  1.5  8.1  100.0
All  63.6  8.7  20.1  2.1  2.8  2.7  100.0
74Table A4. Tlhe  composition  of household  expenditure (percentage)
Food  Beverages  Clothing  Housing  Housing  Medical  Transportation Education, Construction,  Other  Total  Total
and  and  maintenance  and health  and  recreation  purchase  of  expenses  exp.  exp.
tobacco  footwear  expenses  communication  dwellings  (HUFfyear)
Budapest  31.2  6.0  7.1  13.5  5.3  5.0  14.1  7.5  7.1  3.2  100.0  399,104
Towns  32.8  5.6  8.1  15.0  5.7  4.0  12.8  6.4  6.4  3.2  100.0  394,110
Villages  36.3  6.3  7.1  13.6  5.7  3.0  12.8  4.7  7.7  2.7  100.0  377,344
I Male  adult  34.8  10.4  5.0  17.1  4.6  3.6  12.0  6.2  3.0  3.5  100.0  199,575
I Female  adult  37.2  3.7  4.8  23.6  6.1  5.5  5.9  5.1  4.8  3.3  100.0  162,784
I Adult  with children  32.4  3.9  9.5  16.7  5.2  3.2  9.0  7.6  10.1  2.3  100.0  322,701
2+ Adults  34.9  6.5  6.7  14.4  5.7  4.2  12.7  5.7  6.0  3.2  100.0  388,573
2 Adults  with 1-2
children  30.5  5.4  8.8  12.5  5.7  3.4  15.4  6.7  8.7  2.8  100.0  488,743
2 Adults  with 3
children  33.2  5.7  7.7  12.2  5.2  3.1  12.2  6.2  12.3  2.2  100.0  553,108
2 Adults with  4+
children  41.5  5.5  9.5  12.4  6.4  3.9  4.5  5.2  8.2  2.9  100.0  442,495
3+ Adults  with 1-2
children  33.9  5.7  8.9  12.1  5.2  3.1  14.5  6.3  7.2  3.2  100.0  566,333
3+ Adults  with  3+
children  43.7  9.0  7.4  11.5  6.1  3.1  7.0  4.2  5.3  2.8  100.0  482,599
Below  min. pension  49.8  8.1  5.5  18.7  3.9  3.9  2.7  3.6  2.3  1.4  100.0  149,203
Btwn  min. pension
and 2/3  mean exp.  44.9  7.6  6.0  18.5  4.4  4.0  5.1  4.2  3.1  2.3  100.0  214,261
Btwn  2/3 mean  exp.
and subsistence  min.  39.5  6.8  7.1  16.9  5.0  3.9  8.8  5.3  4.0  2.7  100.0  313,302
Above  subsistence
min.  28.6  5.2  8.0  11.9  6.2  3.8  16.8  6.8  9.3  3.4  100.0  562,545
75Table A4. The composition of household expenditure (percentage) (continued).
Food  Beverages  Clothing  Housing  Housing  Medical  Transportation  Education,  Construction,  Other  Total  Total
and  and  maintenance  and health  and  recreation  purchase of  expenses  exp.  exp.
tobacco  footvear  expenses  communication  dwellings  (HUF/year)
Permanent  employee  31.8  6.0  8.4  12.9  5.6  3.6  14.9  6.7  6.9  3.2  100.0  481,424
Temporary employee  41.2  11.0  7.3  12.1  3.3  4.1  11.1  3.3  5.1  1.4  100.0  295,082
Self employed  28.3  4.8  7.9  11.3  6.0  3.3  17.6  6.3  11.3  3.3  100.0  570,866
Sole proprietor  26.7  5.9  7.1  11.4  6.0  4.1  25.3  5.8  2.7  5.0  100.0  699,835
Unemployed  39.2  7.8  6.6  15.0  5.2  3.6  7.0  4.3  9.3  1.7  100.0  309,657
Pensioner  40.6  5.9  4.7  18.8  5.9  4.9  6.6  4.5  5.5  2.7  100.0  232,912
Child care  receiver  31.8  4.4  5.8  13.9  5.1  3.4  6.6  2.8  24.4  1.9  100.0  386,455
Other  34.0  6.0  7.8  17.2  4.9  5.0  9.6  5.2  7.9  2.5  100.0  331,689
Less than primary  44.6  6.6  4.9  18.3  5.9  4.5  4.1  3.2  5.5  2.5  100.0  203,048
Primary  39.4  7.1  6.6  15.9  5.4  3.6  8.6  5.1  5.4  3.0  100.0  313,339
Vocational  33.8  6.5  8.1  13.5  5.6  3.4  13.3  5.7  7.0  3.1  100.0  448,921
Special post primary  33.0  7.2  7.8  14.6  4.4  5.1  9.2  6.0  9.8  3.1  100.0  344,284
Secondary grammnar  30.7  5.2  7.6  13.9  5.5  4.0  12.5  6.9  10.9  2.8  100.0  434,207
Other secondary  30.0  5.2  7.8  13.0  5.9  3.8  17.0  6.9  7.4  2.9  100.0  480,887
High school  26.5  4.7  8.7  12.4  6.0  4.6  19.1  8.5  5.6  4.0  100.0  539,640
University  25.8  4.2  8.3  11.4  5.4  4.2  19.6  7.7  9.9  3.4  100.0  587,840
All  33.7  6.0  7.5  14.1  5.6  3.8  13.1  6.1  7.0  3.1  100.0  388,963
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